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Abstract
Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, 
mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret 
service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjec-
tive, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy 
terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, sub-
cultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, mem-
orandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of the secret services. A 
remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain 
“keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in 
the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes 
of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social envi-
ronment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions 
of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the 
early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungar-
ian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to 
as MIA), the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry 
of Defence (hereinafter referred to as MoD), and the Hungarian Royal Gendarme-
rie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This struc-
ture existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the 
soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret ser-
vices in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection 
Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, 
from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 
1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the 
Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, 
in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established 
which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state pro-
tection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established 
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in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted 
in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate 
structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directo-
rate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result 
of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major 
impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the 
secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations.
Keywords Secret Services · Communication · Bureaucratic changes · Socio-Political 
transformations · Hungarian Soviet Republic · Horthy Era · One-Party System
1 Introduction
Ludwig Wittgenstein, the founder of the modern philosophy of language, in one 
of his earlier dissertations [105: 230–235] saw the only, perfectly meaningful use 
of language as a complete representation of facts. He also stated that any attempt 
to use it in any other way is necessarily meaningless. In later works [107: 280], in 
his preliminary thoughts Wittgenstein already expressed his doubts about the role 
of language as it described the world exclusively, and rather regarded it as a set in 
which all activities serve a different purpose than the description of the world and it 
has rather an “imaging” function. In fact, this latter function has been given priority 
in Philosophical Investigations [106: X]: “Philosophy simply puts everything before 
us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -Since everything lies open to view 
there is nothing to explain.” Slightly at odds with the decisive logical interpretation 
over the years, is that not only the everyday “social” language has come to the fore-
front, but also the emphasis on the fact that in the linguistic structure, the linguistic 
sign and the object/subject of the language are only conditionally linked. This rec-
ognition was leaning towards that which was identified in later research in conjunc-
tion with anthropological linguistics. The discipline of sociolinguistics focuses espe-
cially on social factors, which sets out that different forms of speech can be linked 
to different groups and social strata. As such, language is a set of dialects and styles 
formed along different variants, territorial and social indicators. Taking this inter-
pretation, the heterogeneous language set of the community as a whole, and its vari-
ations have already drifted from the original language concept of Wittgenstein. His 
theory is firmly aimed toward the language, as the complete representation of facts. 
The more general effects of the change in the mind-set of the philosophy of the lan-
guage described above were experienced in the second half of the 20th century. [74: 
595] During this period, which also can be considered as the emergence of sociolin-
guistics, the representatives of the discipline started focusing on examining the links 
between language use and society in linguistics around the world. The methodology 
of this study will use the latter version, when Wittgenstein intended to acknowledge 
a connotative viewpoint.
In addition to the functions in the process of thinking and exploration of real-
ity, the most basic form of social interaction, language also plays an emotional 
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and expressive role The sociological, socio-psychological aspect of this phenom-
enon is how the complexity of social structures are reflected in the social struc-
ture of the language, and whether the different subcultures are expressed in the 
diversity of linguistic identities. [9: 21] If we denote the essence of communi-
cation at all times in the communication and exchange of information, even in 
the digital world of the information society, the most appropriate instrument for 
this is the written and/or spoken signal system, the language. The extensiveness, 
validity and generality of this instrument depends primarily on the breadth of the 
social set that needs to communicate and exchange information in the collective 
action of the society to optimize their interactions. The need for co-operation is 
the most important integrating factor for community existence and survival. The 
community’s basic need, therefore, is the identical and unequivocal correspond-
ence between the language marking and the phenomenon indicated. If this com-
munity is organized by the state power, it will usually interact with each other 
in the form of the language of the state power and the public language used by 
citizens. According to some approaches, this pattern is determined by the more 
demanding linguistic interactions of higher-educated, more cultured people; 
which can be also defined as the normative language version of the linguistic 
area. [29: 431–42]
In contrast to this “linguistic standard”, the sociolinguistic approach defining the 
concept of public language, which eliminates the role of these value factors from 
this definition and considers the public language as “everyone’s” or “people’s” com-
munication instrument. However, both approaches are generally common in accept-
ing that another special sublanguage also serves to communicate between the groups 
on the lower levels of the general population. The peculiarity of the sublanguage is 
that it is a less-written, more spoken, micro community-specialized language, and 
it is markedly different from the dialects by region, which can be called regional-
public languages. In this respect, the structure of society, which is first defined by 
aggregation of individual statistical characteristics (age, education, income, place 
of residence, etc.), may also be suitable for describing levels of linguistic struc-
ture. Collective criteria, such as the relation of certain social groups to power and 
inequality, add another dimension to the demonstration of the connections between 
the two systems. As a result, it can be examined, for example, why users of certain 
languages or their variants have no social influence or are excluded, while a group 
speaking another language or variant exercises social, economic or political power. 
[88: 3–17] In multilingual communities therefore, it is also possible to study the 
real and symbolic role that each language plays in the life of the examined commu-
nity and it is also possible to easier understand, how a language variant and social 
identity are related, or why is it possible, that one minority is able to preserve its 
language over a long period of time, while another replaces significantly its old lin-
guistically elements to new ones over a few generations
From the beginning of the 19th century, in Europe, all professional speaking com-
munities demanded the use of independent terminology as a typical set of specific 
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technical terms for particular purposes linked to the specific speech situations of the 
profession.1
As a part of the idea of nationalism, the monopoly of the universal Latin lan-
guage in the disciplines has been strongly overshadowed by the rise of the national 
language, but owing to the basic methods of the creation process of terminology 
– revive already forgotten words, new vocabulary and mirror translations – some 
elements of the traditional Latin vocabulary also survived in the emerging new ter-
minologies. More or less the same process had taken place in Central Europe, where 
the German (and Italian) language elements had the greatest impact on terminologi-
cal changes. [89: 31]
From the extensive literature on terminology, the following cited statement of 
almost a hundred years ago may be recalled for its lasting validity and accuracy to 
this day: “The accessories of artificial word or technical term, are therefore concep-
tual accuracy, linguistic correctness, purity, furthermore the ease of application and 
consistency; these are accompanied even by a negative requirement: they should not 
have an emotional side-tone or mood accompanying words, like the terms of liter-
ary, conversational and any other public language terms, as they could obscure their 
specificity. From an aesthetic point of view, it is enough if it is not complicated and 
easy to pronounce. Its beauty should be like a machine part, which is consummate if 
it is perfectly suited to its aim and purpose.” [95: 78]
2  Research Methods and Materials
Unlike the so-called “civilian” terminologies, the terminology of the secret services 
has the specialty that the secret services themselves differ from other state and non-
state actors, which is their “unknowability”, their confidentiality. The way to under-
stand the linguistic secrecy of the secret services may be through the interpretation 
of the concept of secrecy.
The secret services (state protection, state security, national defence, national 
security bodies, intelligence, counter-intelligence, political police, etc.) had been 
created as part of the prevailing socio-power structures. Since their creation, they 
have been in continuous operation, under non-public (internal) regulations, within 
a secret institutional framework, clandestine staff and the use of special covert tech-
niques to protect the different types of sovereign state powers. The lack of informa-
tion had always been created largely in the dictatorships and to a lesser extent in 
democracies as a “mysterious image” to the clandestine activities of these services. 
The pursuit of constant hiding from the “enemy” unfortunately also hides the infor-
mation from “friendly” views, and therefore the most important structured system of 
human cognition, the science itself, is also restrained from being able to fully gather 
and analyse the information concerning the secret services.
1 Just a few examples to illustrate how different disciplines focusing on the history of their own language 
of specialty and their peculiarities:  [20, 22, 25, 28, 29, 33, 45, 47, 49, 50, 76, 80, 82, 89, 96, 99].
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Strangely enough, in order for this particular research object to be conceived of 
as verifiable knowledge by rational reasoning, there must also be suitable political 
conditions. Namely, the secrets of the secret service structures mostly appear in the 
exchange of power leaders/leaders, but not infrequently during the change of politi-
cal elites, regimes, systems, at least to the extent and in the manner deemed useful 
by the leadership of the new power. In such periods, large revelations may approach 
objective (half-)truths, however withholding information or their “leak” can also 
erode the critical independence and autonomy of scientific knowledge. These are 
the reasons, why the “boosts” in the research of secret services are mostly linked 
to major political and social “shocks”, when the new political regime seeks to use 
the legitimacy of science to criticize the former political leadership or to validate its 
own power. Moreover, the most appropriate means of doing so is to fully disclose 
the evil, immoral, corrupt, cruel, and cynical features of the former leadership. The 
revelations are “delighted” to be joined by a part of the public, which, by virtue of 
its anti-politicization attitude, considers all power manoeuvers to be immoral, and 
furthermore the science, for which it is important that so-called but hidden politi-
cal information is suddenly revealed can be processed by scientific means. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that the research field of the secret services is dominated by 
social, institutional, and political history, and is relatively marginalized by other 
scientific research areas.
The use of the term “secret service” also requires preliminary explanation. Spies, 
Secret Agents, Operatives, Intelligencers, Exploratories, Reconnaissants, Counter-
intelligence officers, Undercover informers, Clandestine Staff, Confidants, Network 
Members, etc. The institutions that provide the framework for its activities appear in 
a variety of common and frequently used names in the public and press languages, 
and sometimes in the specialized literature. Part of the distinction is due to differ-
ences in substance. In many cases, however, it is only their conceptual ambiguity 
that makes these terms meaningful. At the same time, under the term secret services 
irrespective of the era and political-power context, all forms of hidden informa-
tion gathering and/or counterintelligence activities, which have the basic purpose 
of maintain the prevailing state sovereignty can be considered collectively. Thus, it 
does not take into account the degree of institutionalization of the forces engaged in 
these activities, the form, directions of their activities, nor the legitimacy basis of 
the given state power—while being bound to the state is an indispensable condition. 
It is also true that the protection of sovereignty, more or less directly, is dealt with 
by all governmental bodies, but of these, the use of special, covert, secret, operative 
forms, methods, forces and means is solely the attribute of the secret services.
“When we get to know a secret (…), first of all we feel special, which ini-
tially feels good. Then knowledge becomes more and more a burden and some 
become anxious that they cannot tell this secret to others. The reality is that, 
we really want to reveal it, but at the same time, they also know that it would 
violate their confidence in them. At first glance, one might think that there is 
no simpler, more childlike thing than secrecy, but then it turns out that they are 
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actually working on very complex processes.”2 Philip Zimbardo, the professor 
of psychology at Stanford University, interprets the essence of the secret as the 
cognizant of the secret, which phenomenon had also been approached in the 
Gospel of Luke from the direction of dynamics: “For there is nothing hidden 
that will not be made manifest, nor secret, that will not become clearly known, 
and come into illumination.”. The two types of vision can already well illus-
trate that the secret phenomenon is based on at least two pillars, at first glance; 
its subject and material aspects can be distinguished. How this can be linked to 
a well-defined occupation, in this case a particular group of secret services can 
be easily read from this duality. The most diligent “secret factory” is the secret 
service of the prevailing state in which, according to historical examples, not 
only the “hero” or “victim”, but also the actors of everyday life can easily 
develop some kind of hidden relationships. On the other hand, as the Bible 
states: these secrets are not eternal, with time they will “come to the light.”
If we assume that the essence of the secret is the inverse of communication or 
simply the “negative communication,” [58: 5] or perhaps “conscious concealment,” 
[77: 321] we are confronted with the paradox that the most information-blocked 
areas create the most intense social need provided we want to dissolve the informa-
tion vacuum, which has been created. The lack of answers to the relevant “why” 
question increases cognitive insecurity and the lack of information also increases 
the social tension caused by the lack of explanations.3 In addition, secrecy does not 
simply mean a subjective lack of information, but also requires the actual informant 
to intentionally become a “decoder”, meaning that the possessor of the information 
deliberately conceals this knowledge. In such cases, secrecy does not simply mean 
deliberately obstructing normal communication processes, but also includes the 
active social relationship between them and the interaction of their conflicts.
At the same time, the relative and historical aspects of the nature of the secret 
are also visible. Different cultures, subcultures, groups, and institutions with vary-
ing demand for information, regard the lack of information as non-communication a 
secret. A substance, which was previously public, may later be protected by secrecy, 
while the reverse process is even truer: what used to be secret may later be deprived 
of this protection. It is no coincidence that Habermas (1962 trans 1989) derives the 
18th century significance of the emergence of social publicity from the historical 
excess of the arcane and bureaucratic practices of absolutist state: “The apological 
literature defending the secrets of state thematised the means by which the prince 
could maintain the jura imperii, his sovereignty-that is to say, brought up just those 
arcana imperii, that entire catalogue of secret practices first inaugurated by Machi-
avelli that were to secure domination over the immature people.” [23: 80] Therefore, 
with the strengthening of civilian communities, the practice of the Arcana is increas-
ingly replaced by the principle of publicity. However, as the publicity of common 
3 It is the unanimous conclusion of the literature on attribution that inexplicability and incomprehensibil-
ity are as unpleasant and disturbing as when we are uncertain of our values. [26: 130–161].
2 “You may have something that no superhero has.” [[108]: 4].
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affairs becomes more self-evident, at the same time, on the other side of society, the 
tendency to protect autonomous secrets in the private sphere is growing: “What is 
public became more public, while that which is private became even more private.” 
[85: 343]
According to Habermas, “The public sphere of civilian society stood or fell with 
the principle of universal access. The public sphere from which specific groups 
would be eo ipso excluded was less than merely incomplete; it was not a public 
sphere at all”. [23: 126] In principle, everyone has the ability to participate in the 
public sphere of society. Reasonability, rational thinking is an anthropological (not 
class or order) property; “With the removal of the barrier that representative pub-
licity had erected between laymen and initiates, special qualifications—whether 
inherited or acquired social or intellectual—became in principle irrelevant.” [23: 65] 
Namely, common sense is sufficient for public participation. Competence is bound 
to normality. Anyone who is eligible under the prevailing definition of an era (such 
an eligibility criterion in most societies, such as adulthood, the competencies of 
writing and reading) is eligible as well for public participation.
Rationality is thus the second pillar of the public sphere of society alongside uni-
versal access to information. The public is constituted in the process of expressing 
opinions, arguably: the process of enlightenment, in which rationality is the “com-
mon façade” of the manifestations of different layers and interest groups, the general 
equivalence that enables the exchange of opinions at their argumentative value.
The third element of publicity seems to be substantial. In his book, Habermas 
elaborates on the process of separating the “private” from the “public”, focusing on 
their structural fragmentation. The result of this process is the civilian public sphere. 
The direction of analysis, as the title of his book indicates, is not to describe the pub-
lic sphere itself, but rather to determine its structural location. As a result, Habermas 
always keeps his eye on society as a whole to talk about a narrower topic. “The 
bourgeois public sphere evolved in the tension-charged field between state and soci-
ety” he writes. [23: 204]
Bourgeois public sphere unfolds in the space of tension between the state and 
society, and certain people and groups have the power to control this border and 
to classify some of the public substance as non-public. Therefore, the secret is the 
insecure borderline between the public and the non-public. The secret itself is pos-
sible because there is a “preliminary” consensus classification of things in the public 
and private classes; only matter, which by their nature are public substance, may be 
considered secret. Thus, the concept of secret can be defined not by the substance 
but by the power aspect of the matter. In the interpretation of Habermas, publicity 
is debating over a matter; on the other hand, according to the mentioned thoughts 
above, publicity is about a kind of power struggle, which can be interpreted primar-
ily through the categories of concealment and exposure of a matter.
Although the social–historical censorship of secrecy/publicity may be drawn 
– according to the Habermas interpretation above – along with premodernity/
modernity, it gives the impression that a persona in the power structure seems to 
be less sensitive to this increasingly wider openness. The secret service structure 
and activities, which form the hard core of the prevailing state-political institutional 
system; appear to be inert over time in response to changes in its social environment. 
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Not all this is undermined by the increasingly public normative regulation of the 
activities of these institutions, the methods they apply and the gradual increase in 
their control. The traditional secret institutions are able to adapt to the rational-legit-
imate forms of government of modern social organization principles, mainly due to 
their strong cohesion attributions and the continuity of their instruments and tech-
niques.4 If power is rationalized, the secret can also become rational—we can see 
it in Machiavelli. For him, the secret is already an inseparable mode of the practice 
of power, which operates continuously throughout the process. The Prince’s author 
emphasizes not only the “raw” secret but also the importance of the “misleading 
appearances” associated with his structure. [44: 58] By Machiavelli and later on, 
the secret is almost “wrapping itself into the publicity”, since on the one hand the 
misleading appearances are capable of filtering information and on the other hand 
provide a qualitatively different unrealistic opportunity to interpret phenomena, and 
thirdly they are resulting the fragmentation of the publicity. At the same time, the 
seemingly constant character of the secret services in itself, does not allow for the 
expansion of the dynamics of secrecy in such a way as to “recapture” the autonomy 
of the public sphere. [34: 80–81] Even if current political-power aspirations are tem-
porarily capable of doing so, the democratic core values of the publicity will define 
a different direction in their relationship.
It is a very early recognition of knowledge theory that the thinking process itself 
cannot think for itself. [66: 149] Therefore, when we think of our consciousness, we 
are actually looking at some external sign of current thinking, thinking of the same 
phenomenon as the reflection of reality, or as an activity, that creates its own object. 
In both cases, we think of something that exists or has existed, that is, the outer sign 
of our current thought—as the specificity of matter, as a special connection between 
two objects, because of it, and so on. In such a case, consciousness is directed to a 
realistic process of reflection, and, when the question is asked, the answer is always 
the same. Thus, the “consciousness for consciousness” image of the “consciousness 
of reflection of reality” in humans is thus the repetition of the “consciousness of 
self-consciousness” phenomenon that the object of thought—reflection—has been 
enriched with yet another reflection. Therefore, no thought of any particular mani-
festation of consciousness is the thought of any aspect of reality reflected within us, 
no matter how far it has been abstracted from specific forms of reality. It is precisely 
this nature of consciousness that explains the fact that, by knowing the hidden con-
ditions of thought, we can recognize the events, phenomena, relationships, and con-
ditions that these states reflect.
4 The individual archetype of this adaptability is Joseph Fouché. Zweig writes in the preface to his book 
that Fouché’s figure was brought to his attention by Balzac, who said the politician had “collected more 
power than the people of Bonaparte.” So, Zweig became interested in the “brilliant chameleon,” who 
began his career as a religious teacher, but 2 years later, in 1792, he plundered temples, who, as a repre-
sentative of the people, nodded. Louis was executed, and a few years later he became a millionaire, and 
by the emperor’s grace the Duke of Otranto. He served and betrayed Napoleon, paved the way for resto-
ration, but after the Bourbons returned, he had to realize that he was a gray man again, as he was when 
he was young. [109].
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The position of a person seeking to reveal a secret ˗ no matter what level ˗ is a 
cognitive position. He is supposed to have some secret, and he tries to justify or 
refute this assumption. If this is not confirmed, the cognitive process is terminated. 
We have reconsidered a hypothesis and, to a certain extent, eliminated uncertainty 
in the horizon. We undertook the task of getting to know, but we didn’t find out the 
secret, because there was no such thing, just a lack of information.
However, if the hypothesis is confirmed, his efforts to find the secret will be dif-
ferent. Immediately he seeks to know the features of the phenomenon called the 
secret. He will no longer check whether the object of interest exists or not. Entering 
into a special process of cognition, he begins to study, the purpose of which is not 
only to know something, but also to eliminate it as a fact. The cognitive person seeks 
to fully describe the object, thus as an object of cognition and as an object in gen-
eral, he will “destroy” it. The “strange” or “alien” secret, once discovered, becomes 
our “secret,” and thus no longer exists as our secret or another party’s secret.
The bearer of the hidden state of the spirit represents the opposite—anti-cogni-
tive—position of conflict. He carries some knowledge and tries to hide it from the 
secret seeker. If he succeeds, he will cancel an act of cognition, resisting the means 
of contradiction. Moreover, if the presence of a hidden mental condition has already 
been revealed by others, the secretary will at least try to thwart his efforts to describe 
the knowledge. In both cases, the performers are acting as rivals in a bilateral rela-
tionship—which is the hide and reveal—the pursuit of cognition and, conversely, 
the quest for cognition. In some cases, an interaction occurs, which in game theory 
is called a “zero-sum game”, that is, what one player loses the other wins. [78: 56]
However, the loss and profit in this case is relative and, in some respects quite 
specific to all other losses and gains. In the rivalry between the carrier of the secret 
and the revealer, something that is elusive through abstraction can be lost and won. 
In the case of a successful reveal, the secret will not be the property of the searcher, 
but will simply be removed. In fact, it could be stated that by revealing the secret, 
some knowledge was passed on to the rival. However, this does not change knowl-
edge in form or substance. Knowledge always remains knowledge, whether it is kept 
secret or not. Namely, it is not a secret. [58: 21] When the secret is revealed, the 
only effort that can be made to increase the damage is somehow, to limit its spread. 
From a functional point of view, the secret phenomenon remains specific to the col-
lision of only two intentions contrary to normal communication conditions. In nor-
mal communication, the recipient remains passive while the communicator is the 
active party, both as a source of information and as an initiator of communication. 
In communication called secrecy, the two roles change fundamentally. Both parties 
do things they should not do in normal communication. The communicating party 
opposes communication instead of initiating it. It becomes a communicator to a “de-
communicator”. The recipient becomes a known but undesirable addressed of the 
communication. Many times, the recipient is searching for his own way of know-
ing what the addressed information does not communicate to him. The means of 
communication are also deliberately restricted, making efforts to not be a means of 
communication at all. Everything is directed against communication, even though 
all conditions of communication are available. It follows that the process of conceal-
ment, which we call secrecy, involves not only the lack of communication, but also 
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the active and conscious retention of knowledge, in the form of secrecy, against a 
real or potential interest.5
Hiding the mental conditions presupposes, in most cases, a change in normal 
behaviour and, in the case of interest from the other “I”, an active resistance to com-
munication. In each of these cases, we are talking about different versions of lying. 
A lie tends to be defined as a moral or rather immoral phenomenon.6. In addition to 
moral relations, there is definitely a lie in politics, in art, and even in all of the self-
contained experiences of the standoffish selfhood.7 Logic defines lies as a mismatch 
between thinking and reality. However, there is no lie in the “object-subject” rela-
tionship. In addition, there are many false statements in logic itself, which, despite 
all logic, cannot be considered a lie. For example, is the widely known “lying” state-
ment really a lie?8
In the process, the author of the statement knows the truth, or at least the prob-
ability that his statement may not be true, but he persistently tries to mislead the 
addressed. In doing so, he seeks to distract his attention from the truth and thereby 
hide his own mental or spiritual state. Its purpose is to terminate an unwanted com-
munication connection and replace it with another. Psychological and practical cir-
cumstances sometimes make the recipient active. However, no matters who is the 
active or passive party in communication, lying is always a relationship in which 
we intentionally conceal some knowledge and intent. Moreover, hiding thoughts and 
intentions is always an effort to eliminate an unwanted communication act. [55: 45]
The situation is similar in the case of deception, fraud, disguise, misinformation 
and every other form of secrecy. From this point of view, for example, misunder-
standing can be imagined as a self-contained and imagined communication in which 
we ourselves have distorted the facts; misleading—masterfully realized lies; fraud—
an unexpected result for the recipient; silence—an unspoken lie because the recipi-
ent did or conceived what the communicator intended; distortion is the deliberate 
diversion of a given communication act from the subject; misinformation—partly 
true, partly false communication. In each case, we are confronted with disrupting or 
altering a communication process, with the originator of the communication seek-
ing to hide his or her mental state. This means that the secret is not the state of a 
separate individual, but an active relationship between two parties in a relationship 
of conflict.9
9 “Anti-communist conscious influence assumes that people’s perception of reality is distorted, its ide-
ological-political knowledge, its moral and emotional state manipulated. On the other hand, conscious-
ness manipulation presupposes a complex disinformation process that can only achieve partial results if 
the fact of manipulation and the internal context of the process of realization remain completely hidden 
5 That’s why Bok uses “dishonesty” in the same sense as “deliberate injustice.” [6: 404].
6 “Is it possible to tell the unbiased truth about lies? Man is constantly struck with lies, however much 
he wants to avoid. As I recall, in my world life, I was taught that lying is a bad thing, we must always be 
honest.”
 [55: 7].
7 “Self-deception creates difficult definition problems. Is it deception or not? Intentional or uninten-
tional? Is there any communication here? Recent studies of brain function show that this is not a case of 
deceiver and deception, but two different processes coordinated by the brain.” [15: 405].
8 See Epimenides paradox: Epimenides was a Cretan who made one immortal statement: „All Cretans 
are liars.” This paradox can be also called the „Liar paradox.”.
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Of course, conflicts are not always about secrets. However, if there is a secret, 
the conflict will be present a real or potentially hazard. The conflict is, in fact, the 
objective basis of the secret, a secret that is one of the manifestations of the conflict. 
Therefore, apart from the conflict situation, the secret can only be talked about con-
ditionally, or as a reference to circumstances that are close to the secret in their form. 
Any deliberate disruption of communication results from some kind of conflict. Two 
participants of the secret—the initiator (the owner of the secret) and the potential 
recipient of the hidden state of mind—act as real opponents in a fight whose out-
come can be defined, or at least related, to the disruption of communication. Essen-
tially, revealing a secret is one party’s success, while preserving it is the other par-
ty’s success.
The owner of the secret always has certain advantages over the uninformed. The 
degree of erudition may be lower than others, but in some cases better. If this advan-
tage is manifested among people in a formal or informal organization, it will inevita-
bly become an exercise of power over someone. History and practice provide many 
examples where power was based on the mere possession of a secret, and the ruling 
authority was convinced that a person knew something more or something that was 
important but inaccessible to others. Secrecy is also one of the most important fac-
tors in the cult of certain individuals. In such cases, the paraselene of mystery is not 
only a natural accompaniment to power, but also a means of gaining it. In the realm 
of domination, the secret (hidden knowledge or intention) is not only an indirect but 
also a direct means of gaining power.10
Given the aforementioned characteristics of the secret-phenomenon, perhaps we 
need not have gone further from the afore mentioned Wittgenstein-axiom, which 
was supposed to see and portray in language only one meaningful use of mapping 
facts. It turns out that the language of the secret services is a means of disinforma-
tion, which is constantly intended to consciously conceal and hide facts, partly to 
preserve its own secrets and partly to influence the opposing party, to develop a false 
attitude and to make manipulated decisions.
The appearance of the written version of the secret of the secret service lan-
guage, the cryptography, coincides with the appearance of the writing itself. In some 
respects, the era of the wise division of labour coincides with the beginning of the 
10 “Sharing information is one of the most important symbolic expressions of political position and 
prestige in any dictatorship. Although somewhat offended, Vladimír Farkas, who was the head and then 
deputy leader of the National Protection Authority’s cross-border reconnaissance organization, drew a 
credible picture of this in his memory, and from 1950 to 1953 he was also a member of the State Secu-
rity Authority College: “I considered it a ridiculous manifestation of mistrust in the country that I, as 
the head of one of the most important departments of the State Security Authority, did not get access to 
MTI’s confidential information reports, which primarily contained news from Hungarian-language for-
eign radio broadcasts and the press. It is true that more and more Hungarian emigrate press products 
were available to me at that time.” [18:34, 72: 8].
from the target persons and target groups. This is partly because the sharpest part of the implementation 
of conscious manipulation has come into the hands of the imperialist secret services, and partly because 
they have the secret means and methods by which the fact of manipulation can be kept secret” - writes 




writing era, with the discovery of a way to deliver important news to their destina-
tion by interlaced messengers. This relay messenger system evolved first in the Per-
sians, then used extensively by the Greeks, but it also evolved into an entire system 
in the some of the most remote countries and parts of the world: China, India, South 
America. The acquisition of these documents was henceforth the most important 
task of the spy organization in every state, and cryptography, which made the sub-
stance of the documents indelible to strangers, was quickly developed to counteract 
them. The essence of cryptography is that although the substance of the message 
is real, only the target person can decipher the information that is encrypted. Until 
now, Caesar cipher is the correspondent method in which Julius Caesar used to tell 
the number of letters in the cipher besides the secret message. From a linguistic-
substantive point of view, cryptography is no different from public speaking, since 
only the formal-morphological aspects of the system of expressing ideas become 
secret. [3, 17, 42, 46, 69]
Similarly, the formal aspects of the secret language were represented by codes, 
abbreviations, numbers, and symbols that blocked not only enemy forces, but also 
uninitiated persons within the services from information, documents, files, target 
persons, and objects; they wanted to make identifiable collaborators and operations 
outside. One of the most well- known markings in the secret services world is MI5 
and MI6. Elizabeth I of England commissioned Sir Francis Walsingham to set up 
an imperial secret service in 1568 to deal with the impending external and internal 
threats. This organization had operated from the outset within the army, serving as 
a ground and maritime intelligence service. In 1910, as part of preparations for the 
World War, “civilian” services were set up to carry out external intelligence and 
internal counter-intelligence tasks. At the same time, remembering their military 
origins, they retained the flag in their name, leaving Military Intelligence in their 
name and MI5 for the domestic division and MI6 for the espionage (at that time 
in Ireland intelligence was conducted by the Scotland Yard Special Division). [94: 
102]
In Hungary even between the two world wars, similar marking was used by the 
Central Investigative Command Staff Subdivision to assign—the Group “A” of Min-
istry of Defence (hereinafter referred toas MoD) Department VI-2—the Intelligence 
and Counter-intelligence Centre of the MoD Chief of Staff—Department VI-2, and 
later simply Department 2. After 1953, the supervision tasks of the State Security 
Authority within the activity of counter-reaction in ideological and scientific areas 
had returned to the fundamental responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
and they were providing for Department 4 of General Department IV, even the eco-
nomic-intelligence tasks had been designated immediately before the change of the 
regime to Department II/I-14. Following the infamous “Danube-gate” interception 
scandal in the year of the regime change in Hungary, public opinion throughout the 
country knew that the State Security General Directorate III/III Department had the 
task of political counter-reaction, but decoding the other cover numbers remained 
largely unsuccessful. [73]
Moreover, more mysterious is the generation methods of the alias or cover-name 
of the people in the agent network (agents, confidents, and clandestine staff). The 
cover-name was given by the case officer at the time of recruitment, included not 
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only on the ‘File No. 6’ – which was used for documenting his recruitment -, but 
also in the work file containing his reports and in the record of all operational meas-
ures with which he had been involved. There were no more detailed rules in the 
terms of “aliasing,” but obviously the recruited person could not use his own name 
as a pseudonym, and the given cover-name could not be offensive, disobliging, or 
in any way an opportunity for de-conspiration. [54: 191–194] Initially, the cover-
name had been chosen using the names of historical figures (“István Széchenyi”), 
former politicians (“Pál Teleki”) or widely known artists (“Katalin Karádi”). How-
ever, a 1964 deputy interior Minister’s order put an end to this practice: “The person 
being recruited should be consulted on the use of the cover-name. In most cases, the 
cover-name is chosen by the recruitment candidate himself from a set of alternatives 
provided by the case officer. It is forbidden to choose or give the names of promi-
nent figures of historical and public life or of cultural history.11 Interestingly, Rus-
sian emigrants from the Soviet system frequently travelled under the pseudonyms 
“Ludendorff” and “Horthy” between Munich, Vienna and Budapest in the early 
twenties.12 In addition to the cover-names of the agents in his network, the secrecy 
concerned the designation of the target person, the target objects, but also the opera-
tive designations of cover works, cover stories (“legends”). [51: 62]
However, covert communication with language symbols primarily contains 
peripheral elements of the secret service language. [51: The true nature of the lan-
guage concerning the secret services can be learned mainly from the regulatory 
environment, from the pursuit of the institutions, and of course from the related 
files and documents. However, it is difficult to fully recognize the regulations of the 
secret services or their applied language because these regulations are, by their very 
nature, only in exceptional circumstances available to the public. The general public 
are forbidden access to the overwhelming majority, or the most important parts, of 
the wide range of internal norms and ordinances. With all these complex research 
conditions in mind, it seems essential to clarify who is communicating with whom, 
when, where, and for what purpose. One of the tasks concerning the interpretation 
issues of agent files considers the following aspects essential for understanding the 
communication situation in which these reports have been created: [90: 7–59]
– It is worthwhile to distinguish between the author and the narrator, which in the 
case of network reports has the dual name of the citizen and the cover-name, and 
whose relationship is far from problematic. The “voice” that speaks on the sound 
recording belongs to the name that authenticates what it is written: the agent’s; 
even if, in the historical discourse, the self of the agent cannot be completely 
separated from the self-designated by the civilian name.
– Speech is always for somebody, and during the speech, we always take into 
account the perceived or real expectations of the real or virtual audience. Thus, 
11 Order No. 001 of the Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Hungarian People’s Republic, February 
12, 1964. [61:21].
12 Hungarian Military Historical Archives. Directorate of Military Staff II. group. 702/403. ny. — 1920. 
and Directorate of Military Staff. I. group. 266/hdm. — 1921. In: 13: 488–489.
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the audience exercises “control” over the speaker to such an extent that most peo-
ple regard him as a co-author.
– The agent did not write (orally present) his report during the observation, but 
afterwards, his narrative was necessarily retrospective. Thus, the act of memory 
cannot be bypassed when reading and interpreting agent reports. Monitoring, 
storage, retrieval—no hassle-free processes.
– Recalling circumstances greatly determine what someone talks about and how. 
One of the main findings of the science of memory is that memories are formed 
when they are evoked, they are created.
– The context basically determined by the goals of state security and by what the 
reports were about and what was left out of them (i.e. what the agent was expe-
riencing). The question is how well the network agent was aware of the goals 
of state security. In addition, the agent’s goals should not be overlooked. Not 
only did the state security use the agent network, but its members also sought to 
exploit the situation for their own purposes.
In any case, the author of this study notes in advance with regard to research, that:
1. The secret services, by virtue of their close proximity to power, shall at all times 
be direct or indirect representatives of the dominant ideological value system in 
their language.
2. As a result, the language of the secret service is multiplied. Public speaking can 
be more propagandistic, and internal language can be more professional.
3. There may be a significant additional difference between the speech actors in 
terms based on inequality and their relationship to power.
3.1 The style, vocabulary, and objectivity of internal commands for subordinates 
within an organization are obviously different than:
3.2 A preparatory interview with a recruitment candidate or,
3.3 A handwritten agent report or,
3.4 The confessions and records of interrogations or,
3.5 The propaganda materials addressed to the public, created by the secret ser-
vice, and
3.6 The text of operational information intended to mislead the enemy/opposing 
party.13
13 Aктивные мероприятия (Meropriyatiya aktivnyye) – Active measure: Operational measures to influ-
ence intelligence-relevant aspects of political life in a target country, including addressing foreign policy 
and internal issues in an intelligence-related manner, misleading, weakening or undermining the oppo-
nent positions, and destroying enemy plans, and achieving other goals. [57: 206].
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4. Due to the complexity of the secret services, the language of military intelligence/
counter-intelligence agencies tends to have an affinity for the terminology of the 
military and contains specific elements of the general secret service language.14
Henceforth, the study intends to use the methodological considerations men-
tioned above, in order to examine and present the linguistic changes of the State 
Security Services of the 20th century’s Hungary from the Hungarian Soviet Repub-
lic (March–August 1919) through the Horthy period (1919–1945) to the One-Party 
System (1949–1989).
3  The Hungarian Soviet Republic (March–August 1919)
The Horthy era’s Soviet Republic discourse from 1919 to 1944, or, to put it sim-
ply, the “speech” of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, organized around the subject 
of judgments of the proletarian dictatorship, has thus far not been explored with a 
monographic need. [14: 10–12] In addition, we can add that the number of non-
monographic works is small and this seems to apply to the whole examination of the 
secret services regardless of the era.
First, it is crucial to the initiating of the research to take note of the changes of 
the language of the Hungarian secret services, that in the era of Dualism the secret 
service organization of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the Evidenzbüro (Reg-
istry Office). The name itself was a pseudonym, and it was intended to cover the 
military intelligence organization of the dual-state. The applied language within 
the organization was German, of course, but primary reports from the monarchy’s 
nationalities and from abroad came in other languages as well. At the same time, 
Hungary also carried out independent counter-intelligence activities, with the estab-
lishment of a state police department within the MIA, focusing to monitor primarily 
on the political parties and nationality movements. [68: 93–125]
In 1912, as a visible sign of preparations for the First World War, the MIA 
enhanced the censorship of military-related newspapers: “As some newspapers 
have published articles on military operations that, in addition to unjustifiably dis-
turbing the general public, by providing clear information about the mobilization 
and manoeuvres concerning the Royal Army: The Hungarian Royal Ministry pro-
hibits all news releases regarding the status, manoeuvres, strength and operation of 
the armed forces, the status of fortresses and fortifications, as well as the quantity 
of weapons, warfare or equipment and the quantity and quality of rations.” This 
decree was addressed mainly to the editor-in-chief of the newspapers, but after the 
14 For example, military language speaks of “reconnaissance” rather than “intelligence”, while the use of 
“psychological operations” is the same in the language of civilian and military intelligence services. [59: 
55, 47, 76, 96].
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enhanced censorship, due to the lack of information, fake news and guesses had nat-
urally appeared in the public speaking arena.15
Just before the beginning of the First World War, the issue of the use of the lan-
guage of the Evidenzbüro came to the fore again. The meeting took place on May 
18, 1914, with the participation of representatives of the Austrian and Hungarian 
Royal MIA. The participants agreed on the foundations for cooperation between 
civilian and military authorities, defined the way in which the central offices were to 
operate, and the reporting obligations and designated German as the organization’s 
language. [85: 74]
After their defeat in the war, on 12 November 1918, the Austrian government 
disbanded the Evidenzbüro, parallel to the downsizing of the Ministry of War, the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy’s secret service had ceased in days. In Hungary, the 
government formed on October 31, 1918 under the leadership of Count Mihály 
Károlyi left the structure and practices of the MIA virtually untouched. At the same 
time, fully identifying with its democratic program, the Metropolitan State Police 
immediately joined the National Council, which consisted of the members of the 
Party of Independence and 48’ of Károlyi, the Hungarian Social Democratic Party 
and the National Civic Radical Party. The text of their elevated proclamation is not 
devoid of direct political stance: “The officers and detective corps of the Hungarian 
Royal State Police of the Capital, the undersigned, on behalf of the officers, detec-
tive and security staff of the State Police, with unanimous enthusiasm, with all the 
warmth of our patriotic spirit, welcome the Hungarian National Council as the sole 
representative of the will of the Hungarian people. We will also announce the join-
ing of the officers, the detective body and the security staff. This decision is what 
drives us to the traditional royal loyalty, democratic feeling of the nation, and the 
overriding, overwhelming interest of the defence, the destiny of the homeland. We 
consider it patriotic to declare that we wish to ensure the order and tranquility of the 
capital of the country and ask the National Council to support us in this work with 
all his might.”
On behalf of the National Council, Mihály Károlyi responded to the delegation: 
“He was warmly welcomed for taking such a brave step. He knows how much cour-
age had taken to make that decision. He knows that they did this precisely because 
they do not want a civilian war, they do not want Hungarian blood to be spilled 
here inside the country. He asks them to do their duty courageously and honestly 
to uphold the internal order, but in such a way as to avoid any conflict. In addition, 
if the people see that the police are not the enemy, then it will be easy to maintain 
order because they will listen to them. They will listen because they know that the 
Budapest State Police is no longer in the service of the reaction. Nevertheless, the 
newspaper Népszava (People’s Word) saw other motifs in the rapid change in the 
rhetoric of the State Police, which “the previous day had shot in and infiltrated the 
peacefully protesting masses. It seems that the great public outrage over the clue-
less bloodbath has made them think and realize that they cannot confront the new 
15 The Royal Hungarian Ministry’s 6966 M.E. Decree of 23 November, 1912 on the prohibition of publi-
cation of military measures in the newspaper. [27: 216].
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and irresistible currents of modern times without the risk of being swept away and 
destroyed.”16
A new term has also been added to the State Police dictionary. According to the 
related documents, what happened at the end of October was first called the “revo-
lution” by the Office of the Chief of the Budapest State Police, when he presented 
his monthly report to the Administrative Council of the Metropolitan Council on 
December 16, 1918: “A retired lieutenant was commander of the city of Budapest in 
the early days of the Revolution, and later commander of the National Guard Naval 
Detachment, on suspicion for fraud, misdemeanour treatment, embezzlement, con-
spiracy to commit murder, etc. having been remanded in custody.” Furthermore, a 
study written by György Auer about the summary report of the Hungarian Metro-
politan State Police entitled “Our Police before the Revolution” and was published 
in the December 1918 issue of the Hungarian Journal of Legal Science.”
It is also interesting from the point of view of communication history that when 
the Minister of Defence on December 21, 1918, informed the head of the MIA he 
stated that he would hand over the entire staff of the Propaganda Department to the 
MIA. However, Interior Minister Vince Nagy rejected this suggestion [8:6], because 
according to his equation; the ministry does not need propagandists.17 Indeed, the 
people’s law on “state protection”, which most affected the activities of the secret 
service, also omitted all political, historical and ideological texts.18 The turnaround 
three months later, with the announcement of the Soviet Republic at this point, 
resulted in the most significant change in the communication of the secret services.
Moreover, the emergence of modern political propaganda was linked to the First 
World War, which had a catalytic effect on the generalization at the end of the war 
and a series of revolutionary events that followed. [4: 16] The term “total propa-
ganda” had not yet become naturalized, but its main characteristics are at this time 
obviously recognizable. It simultaneously addresses the individual and the mass, and 
seeks to make a lasting impact in the social realms beyond politics, and its toolkit is 
effectively integrated into the state structure and into the world of politics and the 
media. [35] The study of József Balogh, published in Gusztáv Gratz’s first critique 
of the Soviet Republic, states: “In the old state, propaganda is the » incognito « tool 
of flexible and wise diplomacy, here an institution of dictatorship that is adamant, 
rude and primitive like the symbolic proletarian fist.” [2: 34] At first glance, com-
pared to the “wise and prim” propaganda of the 19th century, the “rude and primi-
tive” toolbox of the early 20th century’s propaganda is really astounding; however, 
József Balogh’s attention was probably deflected by a series of artistic expressions 
that were expressive at the time. From the beginning of the 20th century, as a sign 
of protest against civilian society and war, they aimed “to express their feelings and 
16 Népszava, (Hungarian daily newspaper) October 30, 1918. 1. 7. p.
17 National Archives of Hungary, K 148, 1918-4-10963. [56: 6].
18 The National Council of Hungary adopted the following People’s Decision in the XI. People’s Law on 
the Protection of the State Form of the People’s Republic. Approved by the President of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic on February 10, 1919. Promulgated in the National Legislation on February 11, 1919. 
§1. “Anyone whose act is directly aimed at forcibly altering the form of the state of the People’s Republic 
of Hungary is punishable by a term of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 15 years.” (…) [21: 22].
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ideas about reality directly, without restraint”. [1:248] It was not even a coincidence, 
that Tristan Tzara published his famous proclamation at that time in 1918: “I demol-
ish the compartments of the brain and the branches of social organization: every-
where, the hand of providence must be shut down and hell, the eyes of hell must be 
put on the sky, the fertile cycle of the universal circus must be restored to real power 
and individual fantasy.” [98: 27] However, radical politicization has recognized and 
used the mobilizing potential of avant-gardism it is enough to think of Mihály Biró’s 
red-hammered worker figure, (originating from 1912, made for Social Democratic 
Party).
In a debate on the “Law of the Order” of 1921 (to be discussed later), Endre 
Csukás, National Assembly Representative from Őriszentpéter, interpreted the rela-
tionship between art and revolution in his own way: “This matter is a special kind. 
You are always dissatisfied if you cannot divorce and come up with things that bor-
der on perversion and run counter to common sense. For example, in painting, Cub-
ism, or Futurism and the like. The same is true of literature… Westernism.”19
Naturally, because of the fusion of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party and 
the Communist Parties on March 21, 1919 the Socialist Party played a leading role 
in defining political, ideological and direct propaganda activities. The coming of the 
World Revolution was one of the most important foundations of the leaders of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic and, consequently, of propaganda. This belief permeated 
the propaganda and was constantly featured in the press and other material’s topics 
as well. [86]
The constant emphasis on the working classes’ historic vocation sought to recog-
nize the legitimacy of revolutionary violence: “Power is in our hands. Anyone who 
wants to return to old rule must be ruthlessly hanged up. One has to bite into the 
throat of this kind. The victory of the Hungarian proletariat so far has not suffered 
any particular casualties. Now, however, it will be necessary to shed blood. There is 
no need to fear blood. Blood—steel: strengthens the heart, strengthens the proletar-
ian fist. Blood will make us great. It will be the blood that leads us to the true com-
mune world. We will exterminate, if it is necessary, the whole bourgeoisie!” [11: 33]
The first step toward the institutionalization of propaganda at governmental level 
of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was to create the Department of International 
Propaganda of Socialism within the framework of the People’s Commissariat for 
Foreign Affairs. The long-term internal goals of the propaganda work were to be 
formulated and implemented by the People’s Commissariat for Public Education 
itself. This latter governmental body’s Group VII was specifically called “the State 
Propaganda of Socialism.” Its designated tasks—Scientific and Popular Propaganda; 
Workers’ Academy; refresher courses; youth worker propaganda—had indicated 
from the outset that it had sought to oversee cultural, scientific and educational life 
as a whole. According to a press release: “At the intent of the Revolutionary Gov-
erning Council, the People’s Commissariat for Public Education has set up a propa-
ganda group. This propaganda group is one of the organizations of the proletarian 
19 164th session of the National Assembly March 14, 1921. National Assembly Diary, 1920. VIII. Vol. 
17, February 1921–March 14, 1921. 583 p.
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dictatorship and its task is to spread socialist ideas in the widest possible range. As 
part of his work, it uses agitation papers. It publishes educational books, handbooks 
and textbooks of higher education institutions, and textbook processing of the mate-
rial presented at the party school. There is a separate department responsible for the 
‘folksy’ publications for the poor-agricultural individuals, separate papers are made 
for women, and even a separate department deals with the domestic and foreign lit-
erature. Another dedicated organization to agitation is the Agitator School, which 
provides three types of courses for those skilled in socialist literature and agitation; 
Planned Agitation is taught in a separate course.”20
To protect the proletarian dictatorship, the Revolutionary Governing Council 
gradually established several armed and law enforcement bodies, replacing the gen-
darmerie with the Red Guard, established on March 26, 1919. The latter functioned 
within the framework of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, but there 
were also a number of self-governing bodies (“Lenin boys”), led by József Cserny, 
who initially identified themselves as the “Political Terrorist Team”. [53:49] Finally, 
the Revolutionary Governing Council, at its meeting of July 17, 1919, adopted the 
resolution of the party’s previous day’s meeting, which stated, that “the Fabik-group 
(…), under the auspices of the National Red Guard, should be organized as an insur-
ance team.” [100: 492; 102:60]
The functions of the Political Police were carried out by the Political Department 
of the National Guard of the Red Guard, which was later placed directly under the 
People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, which was responsible for establishing a 
national spy network and directing and controlling extraordinary procedures. [100: 
212]
An addendum to the form and substance of the Red Guard’s internal communi-
cations is a daily command issued by Fülöp Weisz in response to a coup attempt 
against the Hungarian Soviet Republic on June 24, 1919, to his crews and their com-
manders (literal citation). [5: 81–82]
“Informative communication to the crews of my command and their com-
manders.
At 5 o’clock yesterday afternoon, I went to the division headquarters. As I 
approached the Chain Bridge, three monitors floating on the Danube with a 
national flag had appeared. They cruised up and down the Danube and then 
fired machine guns on the former headquarters building. I was at the headquar-
ters at that time, where 14 former officers were later brought in, who commit-
ted so effrontery as quality of » commander-in-chief « , that they deceived the 
crew in the artillery barracks.
As if they were acting on the orders of the People’s Military Commissariat, 
the deceived crewmembers were ordered to shoot the bridgehead in Újpest. 
They also fired approximately 16 shots, but soon the crew realized they were 
being misled by the hooligan pigs, all of them have arrested except the two 
20 State propaganda for socialism. Pesti Napló (Hungarian daily newspaper), 25 April, 1919. 7. p.
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panders, who managed to escape, but they had soon captured and had taken 
into custody. Here, just during their interrogation, they suddenly started firing 
a machine gun at the divisional headquarters, and these two bestial bastards 
grabbed a gun during the mess, but before they could be used, with one shot 
for each, I brought them down at the scene.
Comrades! When it comes to our principle, a few hundred corpses are noth-
ingness!
That is why my comrades only have the courage and perseverance and the 
unshakable adherence to our ideas and principles, then our victory. Long live 
the real proletarian dictatorship!
Political commissioner Weisz”
Captain Jenő Lemberkovits, who was also accused of counter-revolutionary activ-
ity, was shot to death in the office room of Fülöp Weisz. [92: 69] Incidentally, during 
the Soviet Republic’s martial law proceedings, a total of 115 death sentences were 
passed and all executed. Of these judgements, 12 were executed for common crimes, 
2 for military crimes, and the other 101 were executed for political crimes. [75: 77]
Relevant legislation often included calls for the historic necessity of the prole-
tarian dictatorship, the revolutionary role of the working class, the task of abolish-
ing the exploitative capitalist class and overthrowing the bourgeois state. From this, 
legal norms sometimes took the form of political revelations. For example, the law 
justified the criminalization of the abuse of public authority with the following ideo-
logical rationale: “The moral of communism requires the suppression of individ-
ual interests in the service of the proletarian public interest to those who have been 
entrusted with the exercise of advisory power. For this reason, the full severity of the 
penalty power of the proletarian state has been imposed on those who abuse public 
authority for petty individual interest.”21
The Revolutionary Governing Council’s decree of late March 1919 on the forma-
tion of the Red Army emphasized: “The Red Army is a proletarian classes’ army. It 
is an equal duty of every soldier to defend the interests of the revolutionary prole-
tariat against all external and internal enemies, to fight for the liberation of the world 
proletariat.” (Citated by Vörös. [103: 86])
In addition, the regulation of the Revolutionary Tribunal resulted directly in 
wording appropriate to the genre of political propaganda22:
“The proletariat can only count on victory in its life-struggle against exploiters 
if it is fought with unity and strength. Therefore, anyone who acts on his own 
initiative and acts violently or threatens, both individually or in groups, under-
mines the unity of the proletariat and endangers the victory of the proletariat.
21 Abuse of public authority. Order No. 1 of the Allied Central Manager Committee. Republic of Coun-
cils, Issue 81 of 2 July 1919. Citated by Sarlós. [75: 82].
22 Bring the arbitrary actors to the Revolutionary Tribunal. Revolutionary Governing Council’s No. 
XLII decree. Republic of Councils, Isssue 13 of 9 April, 1919. Citated by Sarlós. [75: 65].
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The proletarian dictatorship does not mean the dictatorship of some people or 
groups, but that the whole proletariat, in its unity, forces its will on the exploit-
ing classes. This will is exercised by the proletariat through the Revolution-
ary Governing Council until a national congress of councils is formed. Thus, 
anyone who opposes the will of the Revolutionary Governing Council or takes 
unauthorized violent measures without the authority of the Revolutionary 
Governing Council confronts the proletarian dictatorship itself and is a traitor 
to the cause of the proletariat.
The Revolutionary Governing Council thus orders that a Revolutionary Tribu-
nal be brought before anyone who acts autonomously on matters falling within 
the remit of the Revolutionary Governing Council, the individual commis-
sions, or the authorities appointed by them.
Those who use unauthorized armed force (guard or military) are particularly 
severely punished.
The Revolutionary Tribunal may impose the death penalty.
Budapest, April 7, 1919.”
Just as the ideological-political foundations of the entire functioning of the Hun-
garian Soviet Republic were determined by the Soviet-Russian model, so did the 
legislation of the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship on symbols, taking into account 
the characteristics of the Soviet legal system. In both countries, the new power abol-
ished the titles and ranks of the previous system, in virtually identical terms23:
“There is no nobility, rank and title in the Hungarian Soviet Republic; there 
are no orders of honour or other similar. In addition, there are no titles, which 
merely express the rank of official (e.g. secretary of state, council of ministers, 
secretary, etc.). Civilian servants are given the official title used to describe 
professionally the work associated with their position (e.g. group leader, 
department head, librarian, typewriter, etc.). These designations are defined by 
the individual Commissioner in each administration.
Budapest, March 25, 1919
Revolutionary Governing Council”
The imitation of the soviet-model continued in the world of political symbols. 
Tibor Szamuely, Commissioner for Public Education, prescribed the exact scenario 
for this: “First of all, we will remove all the old-bad statues of our city. Instead of 
four unsightly king statues of Körönd (nowadays Kodály Square), we will create 
four groups of statues that will serve as the pedestal of a nine-meter-wide flaming 
23 It can be seen later that these symbolic measures were among the first measures both of Szálasi and, 
after 1945, the Provisional National Government. The abolition of orders and ranks. Revolutionary Gov-
erning Council’s No. VI decree. Republic of Councils, Issue 1 of 26 March, 1919; Decree of the All-Rus-
sian Central Executive Committee of the Council of the People’s Commissars on the abolition of orders 
and civilian ranks of 11 November, 1917. in: 38: 131.
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globe that will float above the centre of the driveway. The centre of the millenary 
memorial at the end of Andrássy Avenue will be transformed into a red obelisk. 
The columns around it are also properly decorated. Instead of the ugly sculptures 
that were placed there, this colonnade will turn into an allegorical work. In front of 
the obelisk, we set up an eight-meter-high statue of Karl Marx, two work figures on 
either side. At several places in the city, we also erect statues of Karl Marx, slightly 
smaller than five meters, and statues of Lenin, Ervin Szabó, Károly Liebknecht and 
Friedrich Engels. The City Park Industrial Hall is completely red-clad, with friezes 
and ornamentation. Andrássy’s statue on Parliament Square will disappear, and the 
Greek-style temple of Work will be built above it. We place various ornaments in 
the Castle, on the Gellért Hill Citadel and in front of the Anker Palace. All of these 
works serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, we raise the importance of the cer-
emony and give fun to the proletarian masses involved, and on the other hand, give 
a large number of the unemployed a job for a few weeks. (Cultural propaganda in 
the Red Army. Budapest’s artistic ornament on May 1st. [87: 8])
Much of these plans were, in reality, accomplished, and the traditional red flag of 
the labour movement was completely expropriated by the proletarian dictatorship: 
“The capital of the Hungarian Soviet Republic had dressed in so a red ornament 
on May 1 that we could not imagine in our dreams. The world of fairy tales came 
to life before our eyes… red everywhere, only in red. There was no side street or 
alleyway where even a single hut lacked the red flag. The windows of the poorest-
looking houses were adorned with red five-pointed stars, various symbols of work, 
and revolutionary inscriptions. Opposite the entrance to Andrássy Avenue, the larg-
est March on the corner of Spa Street, there is a huge red triumphal gate with the 
caption » Destroy capital to build the world’s international communist society « . The 
four » king « statues of the Körönd are occupied by huge red globes, surrounded by a 
garland of columns. The opposite end of Andrássy Avenue, the column of the Mil-
lennium Monument in the city park turned into a giant red obelisk staring at the sky. 
The semicircle of the memorial pillar also bears the inscription red, » Workers of the 
world, unite! « . On the shores of the Lake of City Park, Marx’s name is proclaimed 
in huge red letters. At the intersection of Kossuth Lajos Street and Museum Boule-
vard, two gigantic masts swing with rich red ornaments. The Baross statue was cov-
ered with huge red wheat with huge five-pointed stars. The statue of Lenin stands 
in front of the red-covered fish hall. Above the castle, the former Habsburg palace 
is adorned with a red ornament and the crown at its highest point is covered with a 
red veil. On the Pest side of capital, the enormous, illuminated » Red Man « from the 
Palace of Commerce Bank raises his hand to strike down.”24
However, “red” also became the most important adjective in the dictionary. Fol-
lowing the Russian example, not only the stars and the flags became red, but also 
the army, the guard, the regiment, the soldier, the newspaper, and even the technical 
dispatch rider.25
24 Budapest dressed in red. Népszava, (Hungarian daily newspaper) 3 May, 1919. 6. p.
25 “Members of the red messenger group usually receive red salaries.” Népszava, 25 May, 1919.
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“The sharpest confrontation with the events of 1918–1919 provided the con-
stitutive core of the Horthy era’s » counter-revolutionary identity « : the his-
tory of the oppressive proletarian dictatorship and the rise of it functioned 
as the mythical » foundational story « of the counter-revolutionary system. 
This » sharp confrontation « can also be traced well in the changes in the lan-
guage of State Security Service of the period.” [14: 12]
4  The Horthy Era (1919–1945)
Under the leadership of Miklós Horthy, the “counter-government” of the above 
mentioned Hungarian Soviet Republic, the Counter-Revolutionary Government of 
Szeged had in parallel created its own, different intelligence service. The Group II of 
Supreme Command, which was actually the military intelligence service, had con-
sisted of the National Army Registry Division and the MoD Intelligence Depart-
ment. Despite the restrictive measures of the Treaty of Trianon, the High Command, 
the military intelligence and counter-intelligence continued to operate covertly as 
MoD (Military) Main Group VI or rather the 2nd Division of Main Group VI. From 
1938, the military intelligence and counter-intelligence body further operated as the 
2nd Division of the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces. At the beginning of the 
Second World War, in the early 1940’s, the Press and Propaganda subdivision of 
the fifth Division of the Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces also regrouped into the 
second Division. [7: 72]
In the framework of civilian activities, the military state security organizations 
were essentially responsible for the detection of the harmful endeavors of Little 
Entente-states, as well as for the counter-measures against the extremist ideologies 
and movements (communism, hungarism). However, the radical elements at this 
time could also be opposed by the Political Police Department of the State Police 
(between 1920 and 1932 under the designation of Main Group of Political Investi-
gation) and the Central Investigation Command of the Gendarmerie. In view of the 
war situation, the State Protection Centre was established in 1942, its main task was 
to coordinate the work of certain internal security agencies. [24: 391–395] Follow-
ing the German occupation, a decision was made to set up the State Security Police. 
After the Arrow Cross Party’s takeover of power, the State Protection Centre was 
soon disbanded. In early November 1944, an organization called National Impeach, 
was established to investigate crimes against the pro-Nazi, hungarist government. 
[40]
Essentially, the Marxist-Leninist ideological rhetoric of the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic was considered by the secret services of the Horthy era as counter-func-
tionalizing hate speech; the Christian-national and anti-communist rhetoric had 
become the fundamental values in their political communication.
The government under Gyula Peidl, which came to power on August 1, 1919, and 
was considered only transitional, began to withdraw communist decrees by language 
policy: Hungary was renamed; instead of The Hungarian Socialist Federal Council, 
it became The Hungarian People’s Republic, (the name of the country under the for-
mer leadership of Mihály Károlyi,). In this context, Government Decree No. 3 was 
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already more politically charged, according to Article 1: “The prosecution, which 
started the current year on 21st March and finished on 2nd August, as of an act of 
a political nature, must be terminated. Those who are arrested for such acts shall be 
released.”
The literature of party historiography after 1945, first and foremost described 
Horthy’s path to power propagandistically by describing the reprisals and atrocities 
committed by paramilitary detachments based on real events. “And the terror con-
tinued to rage further. In Budapest and in the countryside, especially in mining set-
tlements and industrial centres, police force units were even more ruthless. No one 
disturbed them in their truculence. When one or another of their evildoing indicated 
too much indignation in the country, they carried out some kind of ‘make-believe’ 
criminal proceedings rapidly, which usually ended up with the acquittal of murder-
ers, who were not found guilty by the prosecution. But Horthy himself was the fore-
most protector of the murderers.” [63: 53] The excesses of the stylistic emphasis 
may have been due to the real atrocities that had taken place, as confirmed by an on-
site report from the British Trade Union Congress and the labour Party’s delegation: 
“During our inquiries into officer detachments—these are the bodies accused of sys-
tematic cruelty—we were informed that some of the squads’ conduct was excellent. 
In case of other detachments, however, it seems true that prisoners are beaten, tor-
tured and murdered. In our opinion, the government should have placed this detach-
ment under the control of the civilian authorities and, in particular, led to the atroci-
ties that it failed to do so. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that disarmed 
officers keep their uniforms and swords, and it is likely that terrorist brigades are 
made up of these former officers who are not members of the detachments; however, 
disbanding them would also make it more difficult for terror brigades to operate. Nor 
can we ignore the assumption that personal vengeance and the possibility of plunder 
also play a role, and since victims do not know whether or not they were raided by 
the police force protected by the military, they find resistance useless, inasmuch as 
violence against military officers is one of the most serious crimes. “ [104]
Indeed, for example, with regard to the cruel acts of one of the most well-known 
figures in white terror, Iván Héjjas, a gendarmerie prosecutor made the following 
decision to terminate criminal proceedings based on the official judgment of the 
period:
“As the suspect, according to the prosecution, he acted under the influence of 
intimidation and excusable indignation purely as a result of acts purely against the 
Hungarian race and national idea, and in the false belief that his act served the cause 
of the prosecution, there was no evidence to show that the suspect was guilty of 
selfish gain in the commission of his act; therefore, in view of the fact that the pre-
conditions for a pardon provision are met, he should be pardoned and the criminal 
proceedings should have been terminated.”26
Comparing the proportions, social agenda, background and legitimacy of the two 
types of terror, the red and the white, it turns out that the ‘red’ was progressive and 
26 Decision of the Prosecutor of the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie in the case of Mihály Franczia Kiss 
and his associates. December 18, 1924. [57: 276].
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utopian—it wanted to create a world of fire and iron that was fundamentally differ-
ent from all that previously existed. Moreover, it was willing to sacrifice concrete 
people for the vision of this more humane world. The ‘white’ was retrograde, and 
ultimately utopian—it was convinced that there was a stable social order, based on 
ancient morals, that needed to be returned and all those who refused to be disci-
plined or intimidated, may need to be exterminated.” [37: 91]
Under the consolidation efforts of the Bethlen period [97], the secret service 
organizations – the Main Group VI Division 2 of, the State Police Political Inves-
tigation Department and the Gendarmerie Central Investigation Command—also 
tried to move its activities from retaliation to law enforcement, while the dominant 
enemy line had shrunk into a communist movement that had been fragmented by 
retaliation and emigration. A typical example is the decree of the Minister of the 
Interior Iván Rakovszky, delivered on 6 September 1922 to subordinate officers of 
all subdivisions. In the decree’s introduction, the Minister gives a personal summary 
of the political situation27:
“I have recently been concerned about the heavily spreading of ‘unnationalis-
tic’ movements in the country. Thus, it can be stated that the Socialists (social 
democrats) not only develop and propagate their organizations at the industrial 
focal points and colonies, but also organize themselves feverishly in the coun-
tryside. These machinations fueled mostly by foreign communists.
In order for public security authorities and bodies to successfully fulfil their 
important function in the field of state security and national defence, I shall 
order that all arrangements and efforts to dismantle national unity, especially 
secret socialist (communist) agitation in the countryside, be followed with 
the utmost attention and against the organizers and instigators of this kind of 
machinations, strict action must be taken. In doing so, everyone must keep 
“vigilant” attention on those individuals who wear or red colors - despite the 
existing prohibitions - in a manner reminiscent of internationalism, or who 
carry expressly communist badges. Of these, those who wear well-known, 
specifically communist symbols (five-pointed star, red button, red ribbon, etc.) 
either will, depending on the circumstances, be subject to the interrogation 
procedure or be placed under police supervision. Rallies, which are of con-
cern to public security or national defence, may not be allowed at all. On still 
authorized or acknowledged rallies, the commissioners must ensure, among 
other things that the formerly reported subject-series of the meeting are strictly 
observed and that politics is not dealt with a meetings concerning economics, 
and statements are contrary to public policy and to the prestige of the authori-
ties should not be made. Finally, a detailed report should be immediately made 
for the MIA on any organization or phenomenon ‘especially clandestine agita-
tions, among agricultural workers’ which can be considered as danger to state 
security and nationally.”




The implementation of this decree also resulted in deeply ideologically motivated 
police measures, for example, to prevent communist propaganda on cruise ships: 
[57: 215] “It happened several times during the last shipping season - noted Aladár 
Győrffy, chief police officer in 1937 - that on the pleasure boats chartered by some 
worker’s associations, the participants sang the communist march and some were 
agitated against the existing social order. In order to prevent these incidents, the 
cruise ships were supervised and ordered by the shipping companies to notify the 
Royal Hungarian Ferry Headquarter at least 24 h before departure of the chartering 
of each passenger ship, with the name of the charterer, the place and date of depar-
ture and arrival and the place of travel. Then the Ferry Headquarter is required to 
notify the Political Investigation Department of the Metropolitan Police, which will 
arrange for proper inspection of the ship.
During the years of war, there was a perceptible increase in the fight by the secret 
services against the left-communist enemy, while the growing right-wing factions 
were only followed by the steady right winging of state-government actors and 
armed forces. In early 1943, the Minister of the Interior Ferenc Keresztes-Fischer 
held a narrower meeting, the only object of which was defence against Bolshevism. 
László Ferenczy, later director of the Jewish deportations of the summer of 1944, 
was present at the meeting as one of the leaders of the Metropolitan Central Investi-
gation Command. In his lawsuit in 1945, he confessed the following: “Deputy Chief 
József Sombor, Major Ujszászy, and Gendarmerie Colonel Kudar were present. The 
leaders of the defensive and offensive wings of the Chief of Staff. I remember the 
name of Gyula V. Kádár, but no other. Head of the National Defence Department of 
the MoD, Gendarmerie Lieutenant Colonel József Czigány, the commander of the 
gendarmerie detective headquarters, me as an instructor and colonel József Babos, 
judge of the military tribunal. The Interior Minister outlined the Bolshevist threat 
and ordered a more effective defence. For both the police and the gendarmerie 
leader of the Bolshevist investigations, Major Ujszászy - the leader of the State Pro-
tection Centre - appointed and ordered a meeting every two weeks, under the leader-
ship of itself. At these meetings, Ujszászy presented communist and partisan inves-
tigations in progress in various parts of the country; In Transylvania, Zakarpattia 
Oblast, Bačka and Prekmurje. The basis for the investigation launched in the spring 
of 1943 in and around Budapest was the propagation of pamphlet in the autumn, 
winter and early 1943.”28
The legal bases for the political—in fact “communist”—crimes of the period were 
published in the Act III of April 6, 1921, which was about stronger protection of the 
state and social order. The so-called “Act of Order”, which also included guidelines 
for the powers of the secret services, did not include communist or socialist expres-
sions, it was however, apparently created to prevent the repetition of the recurrence 
of the Hungarian Soviet Republic at any time. The act’s proposal only indirectly 
refers to the main motive of the legislation: “The sad events of the aftermath of the 
28 Interrogation of László Ferenczy at the Political and Law Enforcement Department of the Budapest 
Police Headquarters on November 9, 1945. Hungarian State Security Authority 3.1.9. V-79348, in: 52: 
102.
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war have proven that we must have laws that are capable of repelling elements that 
have been misled by the subversive ideas of our time. We have seen the disruption of 
the legal order shake the pillars of state and social life, pushes all existing state and 
social systems in devastation and threaten the lives and wealth of the society built on 
them.”29
According to József Tasnádi Kovács, National Assembly spokesman,30 the bill of 
Justice Minister Vilmos Pál Tomcsányi had not included in the text expressis ver-
bis, that it wanted to be a defensive legislation against anarchism, Bolshevism and 
nihilism, because these technical terms can be difficult to define using legal termi-
nology. Later he argued in favour of passing the bill: “Let us create this law, create 
all such laws. I believe that we will truly serve the public liberty, the interests of 
the Hungarian race, and the order of the country if the wounds of the so-called lib-
eral Jewish era, the war, the turmoil of the Károlyi-revolt, the mess, the robberies, 
the degenerate social democrat thinking and activities that the communist Jewish 
Soviets have struck are being healed by institutions that are after all capable of per-
manently healing the order of the country.” (164th session of the National Assembly 
March 12, 1921. Documents of National Assembly, 1920. VIII. Vol. 17, February 
1921—March 14, Budapest, 1921. [56:551])
A similar argument was also expressed by Béla Túri in the case of the Christian 
National Union Party’s openly anti-communist character: “We are actually a mass 
movement, we must say that we want to defend against what happened because it is 
nothing more than the proletarian revolution and dictatorship itself; but we want to 
defend ourselves in advance so that it does not happen. We have seen what Bolshe-
vism is; that it is actually the destruction of all civilization, that it is only liberating 
the raw masses by the human passions, the most brutal force. I also see that through 
the windows, which had opened by liberalism, only Galicians came in. [81:343]
Despite the debates over the three quarters of the year since the bill was tabled, it 
was finally adopted by the National Assembly on March 14, 1921, leaving the word-
ing of the most criticized Paragraph No. 1 in unchanged form: “In order to subvert 
or destroy violently the legal order of the State and society, anyone who initiates or 
directs a movement or organization, in particular the establishment of the violent 
rule of an exclusive social class, commits a crime and is punishable by up to five 
years imprisonment.”
Anyone who actively participates in such a movement or organization, or who 
promotes such a movement or organization, commits an offense and is punishable 
by imprisonment of up to 3 years.
If they had previously learned about it or if they could have foreseen with proper 
insight, obtaining higher amounts of weapons, ammunition, explosives or other life-
threatening substances or materials for the movement or organization, the initiators 
and leaders will be punished from ten to fifteen years in prison, and other partici-
pants and promoters will be punished by up to five years in prison.”
29 No. III Explanatory Memorandum of 1921 on the Stronger Protection of the State and Social Order. 
Documents of National Assembly 1920/22. IV. vol. No. 125. 307. p.
30 József Tasnádi Kovács, a representative of a Hungarian village, Hajdúböszörmény. [93].
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Anyway, Act VII of 1946 entitled “Protection of the Democratic Order and the 
Criminal Law of the Republic”, which came into force on March 23, 1946, did not 
miss the opportunity to criticize features of the “Act of Order”. “The criminal laws 
to protect the Hungarian state, as laid down in the Criminal Code and its subsidiary 
laws—in particular Act III of 1921—are insufficient to protect the democratic state 
system, are largely inadequate, and can therefore no longer be maintained. With the 
dissolution of the kingdom’s institution, the Criminal Code’s chapter on lese maj-
esty has largely expired and is not structurally appropriate; due to recent develop-
ments the Act doesn’t satisfactorily handle the recent political crimes. Besides there 
are also irrefutable arguments against the continued application of the Act III of 
1921, which as an Act – besides that it conserves the state and social order of the 
counter-revolutionary era by widespread criminal law protection – aims directly to 
oppress the left-wing labour movements and free expression of political opinion 
under the terms of the ‘subversive movement’ and ‘national libel’.” (Act VII of 1946 
on Criminal Protection of the Democratic State and Republic. No. 3 of the National 
Law Gazette of 1946, March 23, 1946. In: [83: 93.)
Paradoxically, the application of the provisions of Act VII of 1946 in order to 
provide more effective protection of the state and social order would have been 
less necessary because of left-wing or civilian-opposition organizations, but rather 
the factual elements of the law adopted 25 years earlier. Because of the significant 
“focus point repositioning” toward the left-wing politics and the political police, it 
was almost predictable that the government with time would be infiltrated and over-
thrown by (far) right-wing elements. [101: 234]
The Sztójay-government, which governed between March and August 1944, 
under the German occupation of Hungary, within the political police established 
a new investigative body called The State Security Police. After the Arrow Cross 
coup, the national leader Ferenc Szálasi did not dismantle the existing apparatus and 
even created an additional body within the MIA under the designation of Subdi-
vision VII/d,31 known as the National Impeach Organization. However, there was 
another establishment, with almost the same name called National Impeach Office; 
this was a special tribunal led by the Arrow Cross Party and tasked to examining 
the role of former governments. [27: 401] Moreover, in this period, another unit 
called The National Impeach Detachment also existed, it was created in late Novem-
ber 1944, and its main tasks were only later specified. Among the main objectives, 
this unit supervised the phenomena, which directly threatened the attainment of the 
objectives of Hungarist-ideology and assisted in the detection of anti-state and anti-
community crimes. Its members, the “impeachers” paid special attention to search 
and hunt down Jews, deserters, military and civilian refugees, partisans and their 
relatives. (National Archives of Hungary. K-775. 1/231. In: [39: 85.)
The credibility and contradictions of the statements made in the course of politi-
cal litigation serve well to illustrate the evidence of Géza Lakatos—the last prime 
minister in the Horthy era—in “Tribunal of the General, attached to the Hungar-
ian Royal Minister without Portfolio, responsible for the total mobilization and 
31 Confession of Gábor Vajna. Hungarian State Security Authority 3.1.9. V-146147.
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combat-readiness of the nation”, which was recorded in the Sopronkőhida prison32: 
“The investigating authority, for example, expected him to answer what the govern-
ment, his government did against the truce plans which – according to the Impeach-
ers – was equivalent with the crime of capital treason.” Lakatos said, among other 
things: “On 12th October, I once again summoned the German envoy to restore 
the supposedly shaken confidence between the two countries, saying that I am pre-
pare to take all the measures and actions he suggests, and I said that only, because 
I wanted to obtain the further support of him and the armed forces.”33 When he 
was heard at the trial of Szálasi in February 1946 by The People’s Court, he was 
confronted then with the fact that the records of confessions—which he had made 
previously to defend himself during the Arrow Cross era—were now intended to be 
abused by the People’s Court. At the same time he writes the following in his mem-
oirs: “The audience applauded when I declared that no Jew had been deported from 
Budapest during my time as Prime Minister. The people in the courtroom screamed 
in chorus: » We know, we know! « . [41: 218]
The official bureaucratic, but also Christian-conservative ideological values have 
changed radically compared to the internal secret service language when the politi-
cal language of the Arrow Cross Party has become a state language. The develop-
ment of the style of the far right-wing was influenced by political anti-Semitism of 
post-Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 as well as the literary and journalistic 
style of the continuous radicalizing right-wing after the First World War and the fall 
of the Soviet Republic. At the same time, Ferenc Szálasi was not simply satisfied 
with the “already-established” rhetoric of the far-right, but he himself developed this 
despite his own neologist practice. In all of these changes, there are visibly strong 
parallels with the development of the Nazi language: “The Third Reich had created 
only a few words in its own language, perhaps, indeed, none. The Nazi language 
refers to the foreign world in many ways, and takes many other words from the pre-
Hitler German language. But now it changes the word value and word frequency, 
makes this language a common property that used to be the property of some of a 
small elite before, seizes them for the party while infusing words, phrases and sen-
tence forms with its own poison, puts the language into its formidable system and 
creating the strongest, most obvious, and most secret means of propaganda within 
it.” [36: 19–20]
The mysterious, peculiar importance of the word “blood” indicates similar impor-
tance in the Nazi and Arrow Cross dictionary. “At ceremonial moments, of course, 
the blood must manifest itself in a positive or negative way. When » even Goethe 
felt invulnerable humiliation « before Napoleon, he was » silenced by the word of 
blood « ; when the Dollfuss government turned against the Austrian National Social-
ists, then » against the word of blood « ; and when Hitler’s troops marched into 
32 The fate of Géza Lakatos after October 16, 1944 could be considered as “usual”: detention of the 
Arrow Cross Party, interrogations, then Soviet internment; questionings as witness in war crimes trials; 
retirement, average work, and modest monthly wages to provide the most livelihood. [41: 319–331].
33 Record of the hearings of the former Prime Minister Géza Lakatos on the criminal case against Lajos 
Veress and his associates. Sopronkőhida, 12 February, 1945. In 83: 113.
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Austria, » the hour of blood had finally come « .” [41: 262] When Szálasi acted like 
a neologist in the political language and created his own specific and individual 
vocabulary – “clot reality”, “blood reality”, and “race sibling” and so on.—and who, 
in his political speeches, uses sharp sentences to cut complicated circulars—imitat-
ing Mussolini—sometimes spoke still colorfully without using his own vocabulary.
According to his diary entry of October 20, 1943: “They keep saying, the end 
justifies the means. Aside from being misquoted34—because it is not any kind of end 
that justifies the means – let’s leave in full the fake abbreviated form of this phrase—
also falsified by the liberal-plutocratic-Marxist system—but then don’t be surprised 
by those who use this phrase in a way to attain such an end for which the means are 
justified; if, therefore, their means are iniquity, infidelity, disbelief, lies, then the end 
must be commensurate, that is, that which can be achieved only by these. Therefore, 
do not be surprised if peoples, even their own peoples, will do not accept this kind 
of end, because none of the nations have the weapon of iniquity, infidelity, disbelief 
and lies—only the Jews, who will this end never achieve.” [31:69]
Szálasi also attributed strong symbolic importance to language use measures such 
as abolishing the use of titles of feudal origin (lord, sublime, esquire etc.)35 in addi-
tion, abolishing the term “gentleman”, which was replaced by the term “brother” by 
the Hungarists. [62: 167]
An excerpt from Ferenc Szálasi’s speech on January 8, 1944, before the Legisla-
ture called the National Federation, who had fled from the Soviets toward west, he 
states: “Nor can I refrain from thanking the Hungarian representatives of the Pluto-
cratic Marxist-Pseudo-Nationalist Socialist Association for confirming and justify-
ing our fundamental claim last year that we are either being destroying or being 
destroyed. In particular, we would like to also thank them for proving clearer than 
the noonday, that in this war, it is not necessary to defeat an honest enemy, but to 
trample a dishonest maggot.” [30: 195]
For the remaining Western part of Hungary, Szálasi also redefined his security 
policy “creed”: “No one shall sabotage the great struggle of our nation, because any-
one who does not work for it will die. Every effort must be made to tirelessly, day 
and night, in the success of the retaliation and in the reconstruction of the liberalized 
country. Particular care must be taken when carrying out spring agricultural work. 
This rest of the country will have to supply the completely liberalized country. Not a 
single foot of land can remain uncultivated in this country. We do not tolerate a der-
elict land. We will eliminate the knaves of our nation, wherever they are and, at the 
time of a great travails of our country, who are acting detrimentally to our nation. 
We will not feed parasites and rogues from the bread created by the sweaty work of 
the Hungarian people. We give everything to the army to achieve the final victory. 
But we are ruthlessly killing anyone who obstructs the final victory in any way.”36
34 For the better understand: Szálasi does not refer to himself, but to Machiavelli.
35 The same decisions were made earlier by the Soviet Republic and later also by the Provisional 
National Government, in 1945.
36 Cohesiveness (newspaper of the extreme right Arrow Cross movement) January 14, 1945.
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According to his diary entry of December 2, 1945, written in prison: “I want 
to be the conscience and loud cry of my nation, and remain in this ‘Hell of Babel-
like’ chaos of political, economic and social, worldview, ideological and regime 
change. And hungarism is a burning torch, a lighthouse, which means a clear pur-
pose, a secure path and a trustworthy base for anyone who dares and knows to 
choose it instead of ‘gambling’ with the homeland.” [31: 535]
Meanwhile, the regulations of the secret services continued to be in the tradi-
tional language, apparently in view of the constant and ongoing need for a clear 
interpretation of the norms. On November 27, 1944, the decree issued by Jenő 
Szöllősi, as Deputy Prime Minister to Szálasi, on the extension and promulga-
tion of a new martial law, utilizes the usual phrases of the traditional juridical 
bureaucracy: “Under the authorization of Paragraph No. 221 of Act II of 1939 on 
National Defence, the Royal Hungarian Ministry extends the martial law beyond 
the criminal offenses under existing law—to cover both the civilian and the mili-
tary criminal areas throughout the country and in the military criminal justice 
system itself. For further notice concerning the new extension of martial law in 
the civilian criminal jurisdiction and in further proceedings, see the provisions of 
8.020/1939. M.E. and 7.800/1941 M.E. decrees and based on the promulgation of 
the martial law in the criminal procedures concerning the personnel of Defence 
Forces (Paragraph No. 437 of Act XXXIII of 1912) and in the further proceed-
ings, the provisions of the relevant military prosecution code of Chapter XXVI. 
Incorporated into Act XXXIII of 1912 and the provisions of 1.420/1944. of M.E. 
(Hsbp.) decree shall prevail.” [32: 36]
László Karsai, Hungarian historian and researcher of the Holocaust, in one 
of his scientific article mentioned that Szálasi was warned several times by his 
immediate colleagues that his texts could not be understood by the broader audi-
ence (while Hitler could be understood). Once Szálasi gave the following answer 
to his colleague concerning the problem of misunderstanding: “That is not a 
problem, if they don’t understand me, the important thing is to believe in me.” 
[31: 102]
One can only think - ponders László Lengyel, a Hungarian economist and politi-
cal scientist - that, what a deeper impact would it have on the Hungarian language 
if the National Consolidation Government had lasted longer, how would it have inte-
grated into the everyday vocabulary and how the » language-models « of the Third 
Reich and the Fascist Italy would have influenced the Hungarist fascist language? 
How would we have learned the leader’s dream in our schools, how would be the 
fourth reading in our textbook could have been the leader’s childhood and happy 
family life with the title » Beloved Family « ? And how would we have learned these 
thoughts as a » life principles « because they would keep us educated from a very 
young age to death.” [43: 10]
The validity of László Lengyel’s ideas can also be seen—mutatis mutandis—in 
relation to the language that was rapidly becoming ‘Stalinized’ after the war: “What 
a deeper impact would it have on the Hungarian language if the proletarian dictator-
ship had lasted longer, how would it have integrated into the everyday vocabulary 




5  The Period of the One‑Party System (1949–1989)
The Second World War was definitely a fundamental milestone in this research 
topic, the conditions of the research of documents concerning the language of the 
secret services had changed significantly since then. Namely, Act XXIII of 1994 on 
The Supervision of Certain Persons Occupying Important Positions, amended in 
1996, handed over the documents of the communist secret services to the care and 
conservation of the Historical Office.37 Therefore, ideal institutional conditions were 
created for the continuous and systematic receipt, handling and storage of the docu-
ments, which were later also supplemented with the declassified documents of the 
other secret service branches. Such a need and opportunity cannot be availed of in 
the case of documents of the secret services before 1945 due to the passage of time, 
but even more so due to the unknown location and fate of these documents.
Therefore, the most important parameters of the systematic research of technical 
language indicators mentioned in the hypotheses—the internal commands, the pre-
paratory interviews with the recruitment candidate, the handwritten agent reports, 
the confessions and records of interrogations, the propaganda texts addressed to 
the public, created by the secret services, or the texts of operational information 
intended to mislead the enemy/opposing party—can only be the subject of more 
extensive investigation during the period of the One-Party System.
In 1945, a breakthrough in the country’s history completely transformed and 
changed the institutional framework of the secret services. The establishment or dis-
solution of certain civilian and military state protection organizations was largely 
determined by the country’s major political forces, but even more so by directives 
from Moscow. The struggle for control to the victory of the Soviet-backed Hungar-
ian Communist Party (later the Hungarian Workers’ Party), thus securing a decisive 
role for the secret services in shaping the domestic affairs of the coming decades. In 
accordance with the expectations of the Allied Powers, the prosecution of war crimi-
nals was also a priority in the Hungarian political and military sphere, as reflected in 
the preliminary ceasefire agreement signed in Moscow on January 20, 1945.
At the end of the transitional period, the State Protection Department of the Hun-
garian State Police was established in the autumn of 1946, a year later it continued 
to function as the State Security Authority of the MIA. The State Security Author-
ity, now under the guidance of the Ministry, which was directly subordinated to the 
Council of Ministers, was established at the end of 1949 This authority incorporated 
37 Organizations, which documents referred to be served by law: MIA State-Security General Directo-
rate III/III Department, the subdivisions of MIA III/III in the districts of Budapest or county police head-
quarters and their predecessors (the Political Investigation Department of the Hungarian State Police, 
the State Protection Department of the Hungarian State Police, the State Security Authority of the MIA, 
the State Security Authority of the People’s Republic of Hungary, and all their counter-internal reaction 
departments, MIA Department IV for Counter-Internal Reaction, MIA Political Investigation Department 
V for Counter-Internal Reaction, the former MIA Departments of Internal Security, Foreign Affairs and 
International Relations, the former Border Patrol Reconnaissance Unit of MIA, and other self-produced 
documents of the former State Security Operations Registry. Paragraph No. 2 of Act LXVII of 1996 on 
the amendment of XXIII of 1994 on The Supervision of Certain Persons Occupying Important Positions. 
Markó, Gy. [48: 19].
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military intelligence and counter-intelligence as well as the border guard. The clas-
sic secret service structure of the toughest years of the Rákosi era lasted until the 
beginning of the “new phase” policy marked by Imre Nagy, when the State Security 
Authority was re-merged with the MIA. [65: 211–237]
Instead of the State Security Authority, dismantled by Imre Nagy during the Hun-
garian Revolution of 1956, to carry out the state security activities, the (Political 
Investigator) Department II of the MIA was established. This Department operated 
between 1956 and 1962 and played a key role in the retaliations at the beginning of 
the Kádár era, directly following the revolution. After the reorganization of the MIA 
in the first half of the 1960’s, a new structure of state security institutions was cre-
ated in 1962–1964, which was operational until the change of regime. In this emerg-
ing new state security structure, based on the model of the military organizing prin-
ciple, the various tasks and branches were organized into general directorates. [10: 
73–90] The changes in certain phases of the era did not affect the model of dual 
subordination of the secret services: internally, the political power and the decisive 
role was exercised by the Hungarian Workers’ Party through the party apparatus. 
Externally the will of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had prevailed, which 
was interpreted positively by the soviet secret service. Because of the Sovietization 
of society as a whole, the form and substance of ideological content were directly 
reflected in the language of the secret services.
Miklós Szabó, a Hungarian historian, calls the language of the pre-1945 period 
a “mythical” language: “Originally, the mythical language expresses political sub-
stance in the credentials of some religion (typically Christian) and in the visuals 
and symbols depicting them. The noble ruling classes in Hungary expressed their 
political worldview in nationalist » historical mythology « , which phenomenon can 
be understood as a secularized religion.” After 1945, however, the role of religious 
mythology was taken over by the simplified or even diminished version in the form 
of “linear-structured language” of Marxism used in Soviet-type systems, and thus 
made it a mandatory political state language. [84: 24]
Changes in the language and vocabulary of the era were to a large extent related 
to production, political-movements, world politics and “booming” in cultural life: 
planned economy, people’s economy, labour competition, competition committee, 
labour offering, brigade movement, Stakhanovite movement, shock workers, shock 
labour teams, council(s), council member(s), executive committee; party activism, 
revision, class loyalty, cadre, party cadre, party mandate, party session, class enemy, 
class struggle, peace struggle, peace camp, peace front, peace policy; cultural pro-
gram, cultural team, cultural guard, cultural assets, aggressor, kulaks, soviet, bour-
geois, collectivize, etc. [22: 25, 12: 191–198]
In a peculiarly symbolic form, the Supreme Court vice president expressed that 
the judiciary was also seeking guidance from the Soviet Union: “In this courtroom, 
the judges of the old Curia had been sworn in for decades. Since then, even the 
image of the courtroom has changed. The chairs are now placed in equal rows, thus 
giving the expression equality before the law. Before liberation, the rows of chairs 
were staggered, symbolizing that the Curia was the court of the privileged classes 
above the people, where the affairs of the members of the people could only rarely 
appear. At that time, the chairs were facing west, which symbolized that the old 
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judges applied the almost literally translated laws from Germany in a foreign spirit. 
Now, the picture of the courtroom is facing north, toward the country, the Soviet 
Union, thanks to its victorious army that today we can swear an oath to the Constitu-
tion of the People’s Republic. This change symbolizes the fact that our legal system 
is turning to the Soviet Union for guidance, because now we also build the social-
ism.” (Records of the full session of the Supreme Court of the Hungarian People’s 
Republic. Budapest, 18 November, 1949. In: 83: 307)
One of the language-critical researches of the “new period” of Imre Nagy, besides 
linguistic Sovietization, drew attention to further linguistic-political dysfunction: 
“We cannot understand the nature and essence of political jargon, if we see linguis-
tic errors originating from the uncivilization of it and we will not even understand it 
in those cases, when we ignore the fact, that these jargons had “flourished” during 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, at the time of the Cultural Revolution. [19: 63]
In this period, in the case of the secret services the ‘language-imitation’ was 
the predominant style of public speaking for propaganda purposes. From 1937 
until the dissolution of the Komintern in 1943, Mihály Farkas worked again in the 
Moscow apparatus of the Communist International, and from 1945, as Communist 
Party Under Secretary of Home Affairs answerable to Rákosi, he also supervised 
the police, secret services and the army for many years. While preparing a lawsuit 
brought against László Rajk, Farkas criticized the Titoist Yugoslavia in a fulminant 
speech. This speech turned out to be a (bad)translation of an article of the commu-
nists of the soviet Pravda newspaper: “Tito’s fractionists no longer claim that the 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union is » degenerating « , but they are 
going even much further. Today, they are claiming openly that the Central Command 
of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union and other communist par-
ties are occupied by imperialist agents around the world, but such a wicked state-
ment can only be raised by those who themselves are agents of the imperialists and 
are working on the disarmament and destruction of unity of the communist world. 
(Legacy documents of Farkas Mihály and Farkas Vladimir. Archives of Manuscripts 
of the National Széchényi Library, 429. f. 63–71. fol.)
However, in December 1949, in a similar style and enthusiasm—and in almost 
the same words -the State Security Authority was greeted by the then Minister of 
Justice, Ferenc Nezvál, in the parliamentary budget debate38: “Honourable parlia-
ment! Last, but not least, I left the role and importance of the State Security Author-
ity. I cannot conceal that our people noted it shockingly, that the imperialist spy ring 
has infiltrated our state apparatus and people’s economy. The imperialists organ-
ized a gang of murderers and spies in our country to destroy our state order and 
our economy. The war inciters and arsonists do not like our peaceful development. 
That is why Tito’s despicable hordes sent spies and saboteurs to our country. They 
appointed just the MIA to be infiltrated into the most important state body. Many 
people do not even know how great a danger has fended off with the making of Rajk 
and his gang harmless. Thanks to the Hungarian Workers’ Party and our beloved 
38 In the parliamentary term of 1949–1953, the State Security Authority was only discussed in the 
debate on the adoption of the annual budget law.
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Comrade Rákosi (Long-time, enthusiastic, steady applause), we succeeded in elimi-
nating this great threat to our peaceful construction work and our entire social order. 
We are highly commended by our State Security Authority for the brilliant work he 
has done to hunt down and render harmless the spy ring.” (Parliamentary Diary, 
1949. Vol. I, Session day 8 June, 8 June, Budapest, 1949. 499. p.)
The importance of the establishment of the State Security Authority on December 
29, 1949 was praised by the central newspaper of the Communist Party as follows:
“Horthy-detectives were enemies of the struggle for the liberation of the people. 
They stood in the mercenary of capitalist gentlemen and landowners and preserved 
their privileges. Like hounds, they attacked those who raised their hands on the 
exploitation system, who wanted the factory to belong to the worker, the land to the 
working peasant. Thus, primarily, the Communists were persecuted, the best and 
most conscious sons of the Hungarian people. Only the bottom of society, an ani-
malized and dehumanized person could have been a Horthy-detective.
Our political investigators, the staff of the State Security Authority, are coming 
out from the best of the Hungarian people. Their task is to protect the working peo-
ple, the state of the people, the achievements of democracy, and peace against the 
imperialists, the capitalists, the landowners, the kulaks and the enemies and pests 
of all ranks and rankings, who have lost their power in our state. The employees and 
investigators of the State Security Authority came from the people; they wholeheart-
edly love the working people, the cause of socialism, and their homeland. They train 
themselves in all their spare time to become better able to serve our People’s Repub-
lic. The Party teaches them, they lead their struggle, and the example of the Soviet 
state warrior defenders inspires them in their hard, responsible work. Most of them 
are communist. They are fighting with the Party, the vanguard of the working class, 
together. They are part of our working class; thousands of threads join them. The 
five-pointed star on their cap also symbolizes this. […] This is a source of prestige 
of the State Security Authority. The unstoppable and untiring work it has done and 
is doing for the workers, gives prestige for it over the people. With the speed, the 
security, which it strikes to the pests, creates fear among the ranks of the enemy. We 
can also say what comrade Dzerzhinsky said on the fifth anniversary of the USSR: 
‘He guarded the revolution and honoured the difficult task assigned to him.” (Our 
sharp weapon – the State Security Authority. Szabad Nép (daily newspaper of Com-
munist Party), 20 January, 1950. 3. p.)
Almost 1 year later, following the (formal) dissolution of the State Security 
Authority in 1956, János Kádár welcomed the ‘old-new’ state security system—
the Department of Political Investigation—to the national session of the Hun-
garian Workers’ Party, held in June 1957. The announced transformation of the 
secret services was less followed by any “linguistic reform”. The caption “The 
State Security Authority is the First of the Working Class” was a permanent ban-
ner/slogan at the political events of the Rákosi period. Kádár could not get rid 
of this phase either: “From the point of view of power, it is very important to 
strengthen the and nurture the comradely spirit and unity of the various units of 
the armed forces towards each other. The state security organ must be the fist of 
the proletarian dictatorship. In addition, state security organs must be supported 
by the party and by the people. Their work for the people will be made easier if 
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they feel the love and support of the people.” (National meeting of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party. Népszabadság, (daily newspaper of Communist Party), 
30 June, 1957. 2. p.)
Even the documents, created for internal use of the secret services, with the 
pathetic presentation of the secret services to the public had lasted throughout the 
Kádár period. Often, simpler internal norms had been preceded by introductions 
with a strong political nature, such as the pre-legislative preambles. For example, in 
the Ratkó era, the, unexpectedly less efficient, provisions concerning foecited, were 
sharply criticized by way of the stricter regulations laid out by the Ministry of Jus-
tice. This was addressed particularly to the individuals involved in the criminal pro-
cesses. Before they got into specific provisions extensive moralizing guidance was 
drafted:
“In our social development, the organization of health protection has become 
increasingly important and the fight against foeticide is playing an increasingly 
important role in this. It has been one of the most neglected areas of our judicial 
work to date. Together with other bodies, the judiciary has until recently apologized 
for this sinful activity, which shows that they are unaware of the importance of the 
issue and so often take the wrong view. It must be clearly seen that abortus is not a 
private matter, but a matter for the whole people, a serious crime against our work-
ing people, our future, but it also endangers the health of individual women and the 
happiness of our families. A characteristic manifestation of bourgeois moral anar-
chy and incompatible with our people’s democratic system.” (Regulation of criminal 
procedure in foeticide cases. Gyula Décsi Minister of Justice, December 12, 1952. 
In: 79: 126)
Erik Molnár, Minister of Justice, also sent to the courts an almost ‘editorial 
matching’ instruction regarding the case law of wage fraud and level of supply fal-
sification: “The successes of the peace camp, our order, and our people’s economy 
prompt the right-wing social democrats and the clerical reaction to step up their 
destructive activities without a selection of instruments. One of the most important 
areas of their attack is the front of production. Through their undercover agents, by 
misleading some less self-conscious workers, they arrange their sinful business to 
curb growth, disrupt, hinder our development, and obstruct our peaceful construc-
tion work.” (Instructions of the Department of Justice to adjudicate on wage fraud 
and level of supply falsification cases. Budapest, August 26, 1950. In: 71: 322)
The greatest concern with regard to the authenticity of state security documents 
is the evaluation of agent reports. Depending on their substance, these documents 
revealed: how well the political officers knew their agents and observed persons, 
how they grouped the facts contained in the reports, in some cases what they added 
to the recorded information, what they had taken into account or failed to take into 
account, how they defined their further tasks, how they set their expectations, and 
how much they enforced their leadership role. These reports also reveal the person-
ality of agents: does he take the initiative, to what extent does he take advantage 
of opportunities, whether he is a servant, how willing he is to perform the duties 
assigned to him, or conversely, how he tries to avoid them—perhaps he shares his 
own ideas with his case officer. “The substance of the reports may have been influ-
enced primarily by expectations, but the ‘agent’s pen may have been driven by the 
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goodwill of the observed persons and his commentary tried to take the weight of his 
own words.” [64: 145]
Thus, behind the collection of agent reports and file records stands the profes-
sional secret agent of all time, who, as a mediator, transmits to the superior bod-
ies information reported (or written) by the agent. It is in his fundamental interest 
that his reports meet the expectations of his superiors, if he desires to accelerate 
his career within the organization. To this end, he tries to optimize the information 
received within the limits of his capabilities. It can also play a part in his conform-
ism: it is “inconvenient” for a professional secret agent to report information that 
has a negative impact on a government’s politics or on leading political personali-
ties. [16: 39] At the same time, organizational efficiency requires that agent reports, 
secret service evaluations, investigative, prosecutorial and court records consistently 
bring toa common ground the intentions of the various organs in essentially the 
same direction and to the same end.
All these, of course, make up part of the substance of the authenticity of the doc-
uments. Compared to this, the ‘formal’ page represented by the language seems sec-
ondary. “The voice of agent is almost exclusively expressed in documents (recruit 
materials and network agent reports) related to their specific network operations.” 
[91: 10] Although this is the starting point, in reality, the voice of the agent is get-
ting quieter as the record progress and finally it falls silent. Namely, in this process, 
the individual is inevitably depersonalizing the character of the agent and is render-
ing it a dehumanised albeit factual document. Every individual attribute of his per-
sonality is objectified into the data.
This process is of particular importance, when the secret service does not 
severely simplify the multitude of facts received for pragmatic reasons, but in order 
to achieve well-considered and expected power goals. In the case of conceptual or 
constructed proceedings, the result (the judgment) is formed sooner than the path 
(the proceedings) to it. As Pelikán damper remarked: “Sorry, Comrade Virág, this is 
my judgment, not a confession!”39
In the retrial of Gábor Péter, a former state security lieutenant general sentenced 
to life imprisonment in 1953, the Prosecutor General’s Office documented the true 
stories of the falsified confessions made during the Rákosi era’s show trials: “In var-
ious political lawsuits investigated by former State Security Authority in 1949/52, 29 
people were sentenced to death (A checklist compiled in 1951 summed up the num-
ber of political prisoners executed from February 1945 to February 10, 1949 by 159 
In: 70: 196–200) and 95 people have been sentenced to more than 5 years in prison. 
During the retrials in the interest of the convicts, it was found that the detainees of 
the political trials in favour to extort enforced, false testimonies, were forced by the 
investigating officers of the SSA, under the direction of their superiors, by using the 
most inhumane mortification, brutal physical and psychological coercion, and con-
vincing persuasion, in order to admit the detainees to confess on their commitment 
in serious political crimes that in fact have not been committed by them and also to 
39 Péter Bacsó’s film satire “The Witness”, made in 1969 but banned for a long time, is one of the most 
popular Hungarian cult film on communist dictatorship.
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confirm these false testimonies during their trials.” (The Prosecutor General’s Office 
proposal on the retrial of the case of Gábor Péter and his eight associates. Budapest, 
May 10, 1957. In 71: 438)
For example, Anna Kéthly, a social democrat politician, was arrested on June 
9, 1950, and released on November 19, 1954. She said, in early 1956, during her 
review process: “After being taken into custody, I was taken to Andrássy Avenue 
60. and placed in cell 17. That evening, they put me in for questioning. A major 
interrogated me, shouting at me in the harshest voice and demanding that I admit 
that the so-called Committee 6 was leading an organization to overthrow the popular 
democratic state. I did not acknowledge this, and my interrogator threatened to get 
one of my sisters captured and beat in front of me until I admit the accusations. As 
a result, I have signed everything that they had put in front of me. I would like to 
confess that coercion was used against me during the investigation and that is why 
I signed all the false, inaccurate records. I signed the records without reading them, 
they had been written by my interrogator. On the one hand, he wrote lies, and on the 
other, he distorted the facts. Occasionally, when I was reluctant to sign fake records, 
I was punished. For example, I could not sleep for 5 days, not wash for a week, etc. 
For what I could no longer stand these coercions and therefore signed the records in 
front of me without knowing their substances. During the trial, I could not speak to 
my counsel, and as I recall, my own forced records were used as a document against 
me. So those records, which substances were completely fake, my interrogator con-
structed them.” (Records of the interrogations of Anna Kéthly in the Investigation 
Department of the MIA. Budapest, 3 April, 1956. In: 83: 761–763).
Anna Kéthly’s records from her interrogation in the 1950s, were thus unlawful in 
form and substance. However, she began her 1956 interrogation by saying: “Please, 
I am now ready to make truthful testimonies about my activities.” This was the sec-
ond year since 1953 that Prime Minister Imre Nagy had initiated the revision of 
unlawful proceedings. Despite the fact that Social Democratic related affairs were at 
the end of the list, Anna Kéthly could reasonably have hoped that a possible lawsuit 
would have had a positive outcome. She did not think of herself at all, she did not 
apply for are trial of her own case: “However, since my case is closely linked to and 
related to others, I am, of course, now willing to testify truthfully.” [83: 761]
Based on the sincere confession she made, the records could be regarded as sub-
stantively authentic. It confirms the assumption that this was not a typewritten, sub-
stantiated protocol. Thus, the confession was made in the Investigation Department 
of the MIA where the record-taking activity by typewriter was not immediately 
available, and the remaining copy was not retrospectively edited, rather it was kept 
presumably in its original handwritten form in the archives. After reading these fif-
teen pages, it is most likely that the rapporteur, in statu nascendi, recorded what was 
said in the natural context of the oral communication.
At the same time, self-written testimony can, of course, be substantially different 
from the actual situation and the real opinion. In a Hungarian-American Oil Com-
pany show trial, for example, Chief Executive Officer Simon Papp, sentenced to life 
imprisonment, allegedly emphasized his repentance in his autobiography attached 
to his later submitted mercy plea concerning the frame-up that occurred 6 years ear-
lier. It seems natural, that in his mercy plea, for his release, he did not emphasize 
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his innocence and the conceptual nature of his lawsuit—even if that was the truth. 
He writes: “I am very sorry and deeply regret, that I have lost sight of the interests 
of the country, and thus of my own interests. As early as 1948, I acknowledged my 
crimes and mistakes at my police interrogation and trial at the People’s Court of 
First Instance, and I deeply regretted them. My punishment has further strengthened 
my repentance.” [83: 375]
Just like legislation and investigations of the secret services, the justifications for 
political judgments paid much attention to adequately articulating the substance of 
ideology in order to deter the enemy and increase the education and awareness of 
the workers. [70: 143] The reasoning of 32-page Rajk trial can be considered as the 
archetype of show trials and of falsified and coerced confessions. Council Leader 
Judge Péter Jankó also noted that the machination of the accused in the field of 
women’s equality also draws the attention of the international and domestic public: 
“László Rajk, Lazar Brankov, dr. Tibor Szőnyi, András Szalai and Pál Justus were 
consciously involved and facilitators of the common-purpose organization of impe-
rialist forces around the world, which is aimed at obstructing the efforts of the pro-
gressive powers of the World, destroying their achievements and preparing for a new 
war. The accused were directly cooperating with the current antipopular Yugoslav 
fascist terrorist, the Tito-clique, the commando of imperialist war instigators. This 
conspiracy as a whole, through the accused - according to the sincere confession of 
the accused - and with certainty as to the facts, whether in the open or in a covert 
form, offensively aimed the threatened with the destruction of the achievements of 
human progress, the democracy and socialism in Hungary, the elimination of feudal-
ism, the socialization of industry and commerce, the equality of women, the creation 
of a real people’s rule, and at the same time prepared a bloody fascist terror against 
the working people.” [67: 253]
In the post-trial of László Rajk the court focused on the details of the histori-
cal and political context of post-World War II to the same extent as the judgments: 
“Hungary was liberated from fascism by the triumphant progress of the Red Army 
and at the same time as the rebuilding of the country, it began to build the free-
dom it had longed for but had not achieved. In 1945, right after the liberation, there 
were various capitalist parties in power alongside the working class, and the strug-
gle between socialist and capitalist forces had not yet been decided. The capitalists 
and their supporters, the foreign imperialists, wanted to transform Hungary into a 
bourgeois country and, in pursuit of their goal, sought to return to the state apparatus 
those who had partly fled in 1944 and were removed by the people at the time of 
liberation. Thus, a huge struggle has begun within the army and the police to return 
former fascist officers, while the democratic forces, under the leadership of the Hun-
garian Communist Party, are rebuilding the country and are focusing their efforts on 
capitalist reactionary positions. However, imperialists are making plans for the long 
term, and they are only infiltrating with help of one part of their intriguers in right-
wing parties and with the other part they are carefully seeking to infiltrate covertly 
in left-wing parties, partly in order to make disturbances at their best time and partly 
through their destructive machinations to hold back the path of development. Last 
but not least, once all of their agents had exposed by the progressive forces, they 
will be able to regain their lost power with the help of the other covert persons, who 
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have been placed in a key positions by the progressive forces, if it is necessary at the 
cost of an armed coup. With tenfold energy, with a furious passion and increase a 
hundredfold in passion and with their exploitative harassment techniques, they are 
seeking to restore a state that is a paradise for them and for the masses of the people 
only got poverty as a class share.” [83: 255–256]
It is no coincidence that the style, language and vocabulary adopted in these polit-
ical trials proved to be a suitable model of communication for the retaliations after 
1956. As much as the Kádár-system sought namely to keep itself away from the Sta-
linist power-exercise technique and its way of thinking by proclaiming the “struggle 
on two fronts”, it ultimately maneuvered itself into the same one-sidedness, that we 
saw previously in the case of the image of the Horthy era’s enemy. In fact, proclaim-
ing the symmetrical separation between the two extremities has placed the threat of 
communist radicalism,—the perceived or real—threat of right-wing revisionism, at 
the centre of the activities of the secret services.
6  Conclusions
As for the peculiarities of the political language—including the secret services—
after the change of the regime, it can be hypothetically stated that in today’s Hun-
garian political life, political communication, which operates exclusively with the 
face of enemy, definitely ‘outraced’ its user in the long run. Therefore, paradoxi-
cally, the main enemy image of the “Hungarian ideology” of the three decades after 
1990 is the enemy model itself. This is, of course, precisely the ideological settling 
and counter-reaction of phantomized enemy imagery, which features the real politi-
cal struggle itself. The new situation requires a new language, which must express 
the specifics of the new Hungarian political model and, as far as possible, have the 
ability to be simplified as soon as possible from the language of the political caste 
into a public language.
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